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Essay 1: As interpersonal communication has changed with the proliferation of 
technology-based forms of meeting and interacting with others, philosophers have begun 
considering ways in which these new types of communication have altered the landscape 
of our relationships. Although philosophers are split on whether online friendships can 
measure up to the Aristotelean standard of virtue friendship, none have questioned the 
importance of truth telling or accurate representation of oneself in the context of online 
sharing. The underlying assumption is that in a virtuous friendship, there is no role 
whatsoever for anything other than strict honestly. I disagree with this assumption 
because I think it fails to account for the beneficial, generative potential of being 
approximately honest with one another in the context of close friendship. In this essay, I 
examine the role honesty plays in online friendship and make a case for a kind of 
relationship I call generative friendship, which forgoes the standard of strict honesty in 
favor of a mutually created, idealized rendering of the self and one’s friend that 
resembles artistic interpretation as applied to the context of friendship. 
 
Essay 2: One of the most interesting discussions in recent scholarship on love 
involves a question concerning what we are attracted to when we love someone. In 
seeking to understand this, philosophers have offered answers ranging from the claim that 
lovers respond to specific qualities or properties possessed by the beloved, to more broad-
ranging notions such as love can only be understood as an attraction to the entire person 
of the beloved. Although each attempt to identify the nature of love succeeds in 
addressing certain aspects of the phenomenon, frequently it is at the expense of some 
other, equally important feature. The result has been a series of analytical essays offering 
competing claims or ad hoc additions aimed at shoring up these inadequacies. In an 
attempt to reconcile competing views on the nature of love—seemingly at an impasse—
this essay suggests viewing love in narrative terms as a way to bring these views together 
as complements to one another, while at the same time providing a framework for 
understanding love as a coherent whole. 
     
 
Essay 3: In keeping with the characteristic emphasis on rationality and the will, 
Stoic thinkers such as Epictetus and Seneca conceptualize intimate relationships, 
including friendships, by focusing on critical thinking and choice. On this view, persons 
become friends through an analytical process of weighing pros and cons and then 
deciding either to pursue or refrain from friendship. In contrast, this essay describes 
friendship formation—in particular, the initial stage of attraction to a particular person—
in terms of recognition communicated primarily through embodied experience at an 
unconscious level. Drawing on concepts from both ancient and contemporary philosophy, 
this essay sketches a phenomenological account of attraction as the recognition of values 
expressed bodily through such things as comportment, language and gestures. 
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CHAPTER 1. TRUTH TELLING AND ONLINE FRIENDSHIPS: A CASE FOR 
“APPROXIMATE HONESTY” 
1.1 Introduction 
 As interpersonal communication has changed with the proliferation of 
technology-based forms of meeting and interacting with others, philosophers have begun 
considering ways in which these new types of communication have altered the landscape 
of our relationships. Among those interested in this topic, focus has converged upon 
Aristotle’s formulation of the three kinds of friendship, with particular attention given to 
virtue friendship, which Aristotle grants an esteemed status by characterizing it both as 
the highest form of friendship available to humans, and also as “complete.” In calling 
virtue friendship complete, Aristotle points out that, in addition to the mutual cultivation 
of virtue, friendships of this sort partake in each of the other kinds of friendship as well; 
namely, they prove to be both pleasurable and useful. Recently, debate about whether 
friendships conducted mainly or exclusively through online interactions qualify as “real” 
and how they stack up against traditional face-to-face relationships has dominated the 
conversation. While most are willing to grant technology a role in maintaining an existing 
relationship, few have suggested that online friendships rise to the high expectations 
demanded of the Aristotelian virtue friendship. Thus, two camps have emerged: there are 
those who claim that technology has largely undermined and debased the institution of 
friendship—or at least threatens to—and those who maintain that technology can be used 
as a tool to enhance existing friendships, and as a vehicle to forge significant and 
meaningful new ones. 
 Generally, those we might call “technology skeptics” argue that while email, 




communication (often characterized as quick and/or shallow), reliance on or overuse of 
these tech-mediated methods is incompatible with close friendships. Reasons for 
reluctance to embrace this type of communication vary, but most critics share the 
conviction that virtual friendships inevitably lack some essential features present in 
person-to-person relationships and this, in turn, makes them inferior.  
 Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews were among the first philosophers to attempt 
to address this issue. In a 2000 article titled “Unreal Friends,” Cocking and Matthews 
begin with the notion that “context affects content”—the circumstances under which we 
communicate with one another bear upon the information we are able to exchange (225). 
This point is used to argue that due to certain “structural features” of internet 
correspondence—such as how one’s self-presentation is limited to “voluntary 
disclosures”—internet friends cannot meet the demands of the complete friendship 
Aristotle describes. Specifically, Cocking and Matthews warn that voluntary self- 
disclosures are vulnerable to distortion and thus they object to the way internet 
correspondence, as a non-embodied form of communication, “permits and disposes us to 
present a skewed picture to others of what we are like” (225).  
 In fact, according to Cocking and Matthews, more than one structural feature of 
internet correspondence contributes to the freedom and leverage wielded by individuals 
as they craft versions of themselves they wish to put forward to others. Time 
constrictions, pressure to react to bodily cues and facial expressions, fear of betraying 
oneself, physically, under personal scrutiny—outside of traditional face-to-face 
interactions, each of these fades to minimal relevancy.  Instead, when communicating 




with a high level of control and choice” (228). In exclusively online contexts, the person 
we make available to others turns out to be a  
 carefully constructed self, one that is able, for example, to concoct much   
 more careful and thought-out responses to questions than I am able to in   
 the non-virtual case. In the virtual case I can construct a highly controlled   
 and chosen self-presentation. I can play down, put a positive or light-  
 hearted spin on, or completely screen out the various things I don’t   
 particularly like about myself.  (228) 
  
Without the built-in verification checks of person-to-person interactions, Cocking and 
Matthews claim that online friends are at a disadvantage with respect to the accuracy of 
their knowledge of one other.  
 Similar concerns are echoed by others. Several recent critiques of online 
relationships cite the possibility, likelihood, and even inevitability of online friendship as 
uniquely susceptible to the problem of edited selves. Michael McFall, for instance, argues 
that “character-friendships cannot be created and sustained entirely through technological 
mediation” because they rely on a type of communication he calls “multi-filtered” (221; 
224). McFall makes a distinction between “single” and “multi” filtered communication, 
where single-filtered communication, because it is experienced directly by the observer 
without additional levels of interpretation, is considered superior in terms of accurate 
conveyance of information. As an example of the difference, McFall describes a person 
relaying the details of an incident which occurred at a lunch meeting among a group of 
co-workers. Unless one is present at the meeting to observe interactions first-hand 




providing the report. McFall imagines a scenario where a person recounts an altercation 
and then seeks moral advice from a friend who was not present. Because the details come 
to the friend already selected and interpreted by the storyteller (multi-filtered), McFall 
argues that the friend’s ability to provide guidance has been compromised. With internet 
friendships, McFall suggests this kind of multi-filtered communication disadvantage 
would be the norm, and would thus have a negative impact on the development of 
character friendships.  
 Not all philosophers have agreed with these critical assessments. As a rejoinder to 
this type of objection, Alexis Elder and Adam Briggle argue for the legitimacy of 
friendships mediated through technology-based forms of communication. In “Excellent 
Online Friendships: An Aristotelian Defense of Social Media” Elder makes a broad-
ranging case for online friendships as real and meaningful. Against opposing claims that 
online friendships are inherently less-than, Elder supports her view that friendships 
“conducted predominantly online may qualify as the best sort of friendship” by showing 
how the Aristotelian elements of “conversation and thought”—essential to complete 
friendship—are available to online relationships in much the same way as they are to 
non-virtual ones. Citing examples of how friends can share music, photos and video links 
with one another as a means to enhance their mutual appreciation for such things, she 
effectively demonstrates how “social media preserves the relevantly human and valuable 
portions of life, especially reasoning, play, and exchange of ideas” (289; 287). 
 So far, even among those who argue for the overall legitimacy of online 
friendships, philosophers seem content to play defense. They have defended virtual 




in name) and also against shallowness, but so far anyone has yet to make a sustained 
positive case for a type of friendship that exists primarily in the non-physical realm, and 
because of this fact, benefits from this arrangement and may actually be stronger in some 
ways for having done so. Adam Briggle comes closest in his 2008 article, “Real Friends: 
How the Internet Can Foster Friendship.” Here, Briggle takes issue with Cocking and 
Matthews’ depiction of online relationships as necessarily falling short. In their 
argument, Cocking and Matthews’ claim that “within a purely virtual context, the 
establishment of close friendship is simply psychologically impossible” (224). Briggle 
disagrees. Using a hypothetical example of a correspondence between a Civil War soldier 
stationed across the country and a schoolteacher living in Boston, Briggle describes how 
a friendship comprised exclusively of written correspondence might develop over time 
and contain features conductive to the formation of an intimate connection between these 
two men.  
 Because the case Cocking and Matthews make against virtual friendship hinges 
heavily on the necessity of “non-voluntary” disclosures communicated physically during 
face-to-face interactions, Briggle points out several ways persons might tend to obscure 
themselves—either purposefully or unconsciously—in physical interactions. Examples 
include such things as failing to bring up in conversation among fellow soldiers one’s 
doubts about the legitimacy of their efforts and seeking to avoid showing evidence of 
one’s fears and apprehensions in order to project confidence to one’s peers. These and 
other “exquisite acts of mutual pretense” Briggle calls “face-to-face feigning,” and they 
are an indisputable element of interpersonal interaction (74). Contrasted against these 




conversation, Briggle praises written correspondence as a medium through which 
“distance” and “deliberateness” offer remedies for face-to-face feigning and can actually 
open up avenues for intimacy (77).  
 I agree with Briggle here but wish to take his line of reasoning a step further.  In 
describing the war correspondents’ friendship, Briggle makes a couple of important 
qualifications and assumptions. First, he makes note of the fact that the two men who 
begin writing one another have not previously met. In many ways, for the sake of 
Briggle’s argument, whether the two men knew each other prior to their correspondence 
is immaterial. Presumably, had they met briefly some years earlier, or been casual 
acquaintances drawn together by the war, neither condition would figure significantly 
into their ability to forge a connection in the way he describes. The salient features 
contributing to the richness of the correspondence are, in fact, the ones Briggle 
highlights—distance and deliberateness. Second, Briggle’s account takes for granted that, 
in their writings to one another, each of the men is straightforwardly honest in how they 
report their actions, and forthright with respect to their thoughts and feelings. The 
underlying assumption here is that when the soldier describes his day—marching, setting 
up camp, awaiting orders, preparations for movement, action seen in skirmishes, his 
reactions to what he has witnessed—in relating all this, the soldier’s account directly 
corresponds to reality.  
 
1.2 Honest Representation: A Self Among Friends 
 A general concern for what I will call strict honesty in the representation of 




By “strict” in this case, I mean truth-telling that corresponds to reality and attempts, as 
much as possible, to present specific details in an accurate way, without embellishment. 
In varying ways, all the articles discussed so far have either directly or indirectly 
addressed the issue of honesty. This includes enthusiastic tech advocates as well as the 
skeptics. Although they find themselves in the position of defending a medium notorious 
for the tendency of its users to engage in widespread misrepresentation, aggrandizement 
or flat-out deception regarding online personas, at no point do Elder or Briggle suggest 
they endorse such deception. Instead, their arguments seek either to minimize the impact 
such misrepresentations might have (demonstrating, for example how negative effects 
might be mitigated or avoided altogether1) or to highlight ways in which honest 
communication—even online—is still possible. In Elder’s essay, the issue of honesty is 
given only brief treatment. Basically, she acknowledges general concern over the 
potential for deceptive self-representation via the internet, but dismisses it, noting that 
such deceptions are common in face-to-face interactions as well and should therefore 
pose no special consideration for online friendship. She concludes: “One ought to 
exercise good judgment and discrimination in both circumstances” (292). 
 Among the technology skeptics? Each of the objections Cocking and Matthews 
raise with respect to online relationships has to do with honesty. First, they express 
concern that individuals in online relationships are inclined toward misrepresentation of 
oneself to others; second, they explain the importance of non-voluntary disclosures 
available exclusively through face-to-face contact with friends. The ability to read the 
 
1 Alexis Elder argues that, due to its nature as written communication, online conversations “are, arguably, 
less susceptible to deception” due to the fact that they leave “digital ‘paper trails’” that can then be 




physical cues (i.e. body language) of others is viewed by Cocking and Matthews as an 
essential component to friendship precisely because it makes available a more complete 
and accurate revelation of details otherwise inaccessible in virtual cases. For Cocking and 
Matthews, the distinct value of non-virtual friendship lies in the fact that direct contact 
allows friends to make observations and deductions about each other’s behaviors that are 
as faithful to reality as possible. In both cases, communicating information considered 
mismatched or incomplete when viewed against reality is assumed to be detrimental to 
close friendship. In fact, honesty is so necessary to the function and health of a 
relationship of any kind that it nearly passes without comment. One seems automatically 
to assume strict honesty is a requirement for a non-dysfunctional friendship—most 
certainly for character friendship. After all, honesty is a virtue. 
 Shannon Vallor, chair of the Ethics of Data and Artificial Intelligence department 
at the Edinburgh Futures Institute, has authored several works on the intersection of 
friendship and technology. In a recent essay, Vallor advocates for the use of virtue ethics 
as a normative framework through which one might view questions about how we can 
best use technology to foster healthy human relationships. Toward the end of the essay, 
Vallor issues an invitation for tech users to prioritize the virtue of honesty in crafting 
their internet selves. Like Cocking and Matthews, Vallor voices apprehension at the way 
many have created an online presence that is less than honest. “Construction of a profile,” 
she notes, encourages members to construct a carefully edited version of themselves, a 
version perhaps aimed more at drawing in as many ‘friends’ as possible than at exposing 
one’s authentic personality” (Social 166). Implicit in Vallor’s criticism here is the 




of the standards of strict honesty is problematic, casting shades of doubt over personal 
trust and threatening to undermine the possibility of friendship in general, and virtue 
friendship in particular.   
 So, is this all there is to say on the matter? Is strict honesty a necessary 
requirement for close character friendships? In what follows I want to consider, for a 
moment, the merits of setting aside the rigorous standards of strict honesty in favor of 
what might be called approximate honesty. Contrasted against the preoccupation with 
presenting things exactly as they are—a practice associated with strict honesty—
approximate honesty focuses instead on possibility, potential and perfection: opening up 
space for possibilities, maximizing potential and striving for perfection.  For a certain 
kind of friendship, the advantages of approximate honesty may be significant. It allows 
for the prospect of friends (at times) to be approximately honest with one another as they 
present aspects of their lives in an idealized fashion, within a space opened by distance, 
which is designed to facilitate the mutual creation of something beautiful. The remainder 
of this essay will describe such a relationship—which I call generative friendship—and 
will discuss the conditions under which communication within the context of the 
friendship might not satisfy the standards of strict honesty, and yet still qualify as an 
intimate character friendship. This kind of friendship is one that has not been considered 
in the literature thus far. 
 I am interested in a specific kind of friendship where the “reading” or ascertaining 
of the details of one’s life becomes irrelevant because the friendship is centered on 
something else entirely. In such cases, the particular details of one’s life fade out of focus 




relationship can play an important role in the creative, intellectual and moral 
development of an individual. Because creativity, reasoning, and moral accountability are 
elements of logos—the distinctive features of human flourishing—generative friendship 
meets Aristotle’s high standard for complete friendship. 
 
1.3 The Role of the Beautiful in Creative, Intellectual and Moral 
Development 
 In seeking to describe what he hoped to achieve in creating works of art, the Pre-
Raphaelite painter Edward Burne-Jones said, “I mean, by a picture, a beautiful romantic 
dream of something that never was, never will be—in a light better than any light that 
ever shone—in a land no one can define, or remember, only desire—and the forms are 
divinely beautiful” (qtd in Smith). The kind of vision offered here is one where art is seen 
as an idealization; where the role of the artist is to re-present, through imaginative 
interpretation, an image of something not fashioned with strict allegiance to how things 
appear “in reality,” but how things might be if they were to exist in a perfected state.  
 As an example of how Burne-Jones’ philosophy of art might be applied to a 
particular work, consider Ophelia, a painting by fellow Pre-Raphaelite and Burne-Jones 
contemporary John Everett Millais. Millais’ depiction of Ophelia floating face-up, her 
body strewn with flowers, having drowned in despair, is notable for the aesthetic beauty 
with which the tragic scene is rendered. On the one hand, Millais’ attention to detail—
including each flower petal and frond—achieves an impressive, nearly photographic level 
of accuracy. He spent many months on location painting en plein air along the Hogsmill 




(Tate). In this sense at least, Millais’ Ophelia can be considered naturalistic or realistic. 
His son John even claimed that when a botany professor was unable to take his students 
to the country for field observation, he opted instead to have them study the flowers 
painted in Ophelia as substitutes “instructive as nature itself” (Tate). 
 And yet, as closely and accurately as Millais strove to reproduce the natural 
features in crafting his landscape for Ophelia, elements of its composition are decidedly 
idealistic. Most obviously, the many varieties of flowers along the banks, floating in the 
water, and tangled in Ophelia’s dress serve as a beautiful backdrop for the scene, but 
astute observers have pointed out that the kinds of flowers Millais depicts in the painting 
would never have appeared together naturally at any one time, as they have different 
bloom periods throughout the spring and summer months (Tate). The flowers the artist 
includes, then, are not intended to be a direct representation of what he was seeing; 
instead, they are deliberate choices selected to function as literary references and objects 
imbued with symbolic significance. While several the flowers are mentioned by 
Shakespeare in Hamlet (crow flowers, nettles and daisies, for example), others were 
added by Millais due to their symbolic associations (forget-me-nots, and meadowsweet, 
for instance2), as well as for general aesthetic purposes3. So, in calling the painting 
idealistic, we mean both in aesthetic terms and also with respect to communicating 
meaning. The completed image Millais ultimately presents to the viewer is not meant to 
function like a snapshot of a scene from Shakespeare to be taken in and scrutinized 
against “reality” (whatever that would mean, since the episode to which this painting 
 
2 From “Wear Your Rue with Indifference” secretgardening.wordpress.com 
3 According to secretgardening.wordpress.com, “Millais originally included some daffodils in the painting 
not observed in Ewell [. . .] as he felt the painting needed more yellow. But his friend, the poet Tennyson, 




refers is itself a fictitious event to begin with); rather, Ophelia is an aesthetically 
idealized image to contemplate and enjoy. 
 Here art achieves approximate representation. Each of the flowers in Ophelia 
appears in the painting because it contributes aesthetically or thematically to the work as 
a whole. But if the artist were bound to a strictly accurate or “true to life” representation 
of the landscape, the flowers could not be presented in the same way, and arguably, 
something (symbolism; aesthetic balance) would be lost. Because the depiction is not 
strictly accurate, there’s a sense in which the artist engages in a kind of deception. But 
unlike some forms of deception which aim at diverting the audience away from truth, this 
approximation is honest in that it aims at truth. It is what might called a beautiful lie, and 
is analogous to what I mean in allowing for “approximate honesty” in generative 
friendship. Like Millais’ Ophelia, approximate honesty in friendship will be starkly 
honest and straightforwardly accurate in some aspects, while presenting an idealized 
vision in others.   
 In art we encounter something (an image; a verbal description) familiar enough to 
be recognized, but which is presented to the viewer at enough of a distance so as to 
inspire and motivate us to continue journeying toward this ideal. What we appreciate 
when we appreciate art is just this representation of possibility. When Burne-Jones’ says 
of the project he envisions for himself as an artist—to create an image that “never was, 
never will be”—he is appealing to just this kind of otherworldly sense of perfection. He 
recognizes that the image he strives to create can never exist in the tangible world of the 
body; it can only exist as an idea in the realm of the intellect. Nevertheless, it is still a 




 The role that such a beautiful, idealized version of reality plays in creative, 
intellectual and moral development is varied. For starters, an encounter with beauty 
arrests us out of our common, everyday experience. Absent such encounters, the 
tendency is toward an unreflective carrying out of tasks that are overwhelmingly centered 
around physical, bodily needs and concerns. Beauty, though, interrupts this pattern and 
offers a glimpse into the realm of reason and morality. Once it engages us, a thing of 
beauty captures and holds our attention; in some cases, beauty can trigger recognition of 
alternative possibilities, hitherto unconsidered. At its best, beauty calls attention to the 
distance between what is and what could be, creating a space for the actualization of 
something new, perhaps more beautiful and full of wonder than previously imagined.  
Additionally, experiencing beauty offers a respite from the gritty reality of our lives, thus 
paving the way for recharging motivation while simultaneously offering an impetus for 
us to maximize our potential. In the context of friendship, the mutual apprehension of 
beauty gives each something to long for, to strive for, to hope for, and to work toward; in 
Platonic terms: it connects them to the ideal world of the Forms. 
 
1.4 Contra Commonplace 
 One distinguishing feature of the Aristotelian virtue friendship is the way in 
which the individuals involved in the relationship contribute to the moral and intellectual 
growth of the other. Over the course of their time knowing one another, each becomes a 
better person because they are friends. Speaking of the friendship of  “the excellent 
person” in relation to another excellent person, Aristotle says, “He must, then, perceive 




share conversation and thought. For in the case of human beings, what seems to count as 
living together is the sharing of conversation and thought, not sharing the same pasture, 
as in the case of grazing animals” (NE IX.9, italics mine).  Presumably, this happens 
through the regular, meaningful exchange of ideas. Although ideally Aristotle envisions 
this interchange in terms of face-to-face interactions,4 as others have shown, it is still 
possible to cultivate excellent friendships, even at a distance. Physical distance, as well as 
separation from the personal lives of our friends, may even offer advantages when 
compared to traditional in-person friendships. Knowing someone almost exclusively 
through their ideas seems as close to the Socratic ideal of minimizing intrusion from 
bodily distractions as we can come within the context of friendship. Furthermore, 
diminishing the role of the personal in the relationship helps insulate it from lapsing into 
an exchange of commonalities.  
 It is precisely this desire —to remain in the realm of the extraordinary, of the 
ideally beautiful—that animates generative friendship. In calling the friendship 
generative, I mean that a fundamental quality of the relationship is the way in which the 
structure of the friendship conduces to the creation of something new—something that 
might not be obtainable through traditional face-to-face interactions. This particular kind 
of relationship is an intellectual partnership maintained predominately online or mediated 
through correspondence. Like the beautiful image an artist can create when afforded the 
liberty to represent things not strictly as they are but as they could be, a friendship 
focused on ideas and maintained over distance could also benefit from exercising a kind 
of “poetic license” in the relationship. In a sense, the generative aspect of the relationship 
 




is a function of viewing it as if it were a work of art, a creative project, mutually 
undertaken by two individuals striving together to imagine and then create—as much as 
possible—perfectly excellent versions of themselves. Of course, actual achievement of 
the goal of perfection is not obtainable; nonetheless, the striving toward, the effort 
undertaken to approximate an ideal, is essentially Platonic.  
 According to Plato, we dwell in the realm of becoming, of appearances. Because 
of this, humans are relegated to producing approximations of ideals. Our ability to do this 
well is hampered by the fact that we are embodied creatures, and our bodies inundate us 
with a continuous series of demands. Food, drink, sleep, shelter—whatever is needed for 
survival, plus many additional desires aimed at comfort and pleasure—generally 
speaking, these physical concerns occupy an outsized portion of our thoughts. In the 
Phaedo, Socrates explains how the body acts as a hindrance to the contemplative life of 
the mind. Although the only way to completely rid ourselves of such distractions is to be 
separated from our bodies through death, Socrates describes how we might attempt to 
strive toward knowledge in the meantime: 
He will do this most perfectly who approaches the object with thought alone, 
without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging in any sense 
perception with his reasoning, but who using pure thought alone, tries to track 
down each reality pure and by itself, freeing himself as far as possible from eyes 
and ears and, in a word, from the whole body, because the body confuses the soul 





Insofar as online friendships offer a way to bracket the physical distractions which 
preclude us from focusing on the more important rational elements, they seem to offer at 
least one potential advantage over face-to-face interactions.   
 Along similar lines, in his essay dedicated to the subject of friendship, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson describes the ubiquity of friendly interactions with others, which he says 
is marked by kindness and pleasant exchanges. Highest praise, however, is reserved for a 
rare kind of friendship involving kindred souls whose focus is on intellectual and spiritual 
concerns5. With respect to these special friendships of the soul, Emerson advocates for 
establishing and maintaining a certain level of distance from one’s friend. Specifically, he 
thinks becoming familiar with the mundane, day-to-day details of each other’s lives 
would do nothing to bring friends closer to one another. In fact, he seems to hold that 
accumulation of such banal personal information—what is eaten and worn and 
experienced; the scheduling, planning, and running of a household—would achieve the 
opposite effect. For Emerson, there’s a sense in which having this sort of knowledge 
about someone can strip away the beauty and mystery surrounding that individual and 
potentially rob the relationship of that which makes it rare: “The hues of the opal, the 
light of the diamond, are not to be seen if the eye is too near,” he reminds (“Friendship”).  
 In lieu of seeking personal closeness with our friend, Emerson suggests we treat 
them with reverence. For him, this entails a willingness to forego common knowledge 
about a friend in favor of the extraordinary, the significant, the meaningful. “Friendship 
demands a religious treatment,” he says, “Reverence is a great part of it. Treat your friend 
as a spectacle. Of course he has merits that are not yours, and that you cannot honor if 
 




you must needs hold him close to your person. Stand aside; give those merits room; let 
them mount and expand. Are you the friend of your friend’s buttons, or of his thought?” 
And elsewhere: “Why should we desecrate noble and beautiful souls by intruding on 
them?” he asks, “Why insist on rash personal relations with your friend? Why go to his 
house, or know his mother and brother and sisters? Why be visited by him at your own? 
Are these things material to our covenant? (“Friendship”). 
 Becoming too familiar with someone is seen here as an obstacle to both the 
uniqueness of the bond and to the goal of intellectual and spiritual growth. Like Socrates, 
Emerson views everyday concerns such as household relations and the day-to-day 
management of one’s affairs as inconsequential and argues that investment in obtaining 
this kind of trivial knowledge about your friend wastes precious energy on distractions. 
Instead, he seeks to elevate friendship to a higher plane: “Let him be to me a spirit” he 
offers in place of a common embodied relationship.  
 What type of activity, then, does Emerson think is conducive to this special kind 
of friendship? Due to our nature as rational souls, true intimacy, he argues, can only be 
established when friends exchange, examine, and hone ideas with one another. And how 
best would such exchanges take place? Unsurprisingly, rather than suggest friends sit 
down with one another and converse in person, Emerson favors mediated 
communication, particularly writing: “To my friend I write a letter and from him I 
receive a letter . . . it is a spiritual gift worthy of him to give and of me to receive.” And 
again, “A message, a thought, a sincerity, a glance from him I want, but not news, nor 




companions,” he says, but “Should not the society of my friend be to me poetic, pure, 
universal and great as nature itself?” (“Friendship”). 
 The distance Emerson aims at establishing between noble souls is intended as 
protection against the relationship getting sullied by non-rational concerns or reduced to 
the level of the commonplace. Although he does not speak of friendship in terms of 
creating a work of art, part of the allure of maintaining personal and physical distance 
between friends is the space it opens up for the imagination. Near the beginning of his 
reflection on the pleasures of friendship, Emerson recounts what it is like anticipating the 
arrival of an esteemed individual, known only by reputation. His account makes an 
unexpected pivot, however, when he remarks that once the stranger begins to speak, the 
elation dissipates. This is not so much because the speaker’s words themselves 
disappoint, but because a mystery has been unveiled. One understands, then, Emerson’s 
insistence on keeping his most valued friends at arm’s length: “To a great heart [the 
friend] will still be a stranger in a thousand particulars, that he may come near in the 
holiest ground” (“Friendship”). There is something to be said, after all, for enshrining an 
ideal. 
 
1.5 Approximate Honesty and the Ideal Self 
 Having first surveyed recent scholarship on the pros and cons of online 
friendships, noting that, for their many differences, an unexamined consensus on the role 
of honesty has emerged, I now want to examine that premise. Briefly stated, the 
assumption is this: In a virtuous friendship, there is no role whatsoever for anything other 




the beneficial, generative potential of being approximately honest with one another in the 
context of close friendship.  
 Approximate honesty. Almost honest? Nearly honest? Approaching honesty? If 
you are like most, the phrase itself probably triggers both an initial sense of moral 
approbation and also bemused academic smugness. Is she advocating for being dishonest 
with one another, or is this just a euphemism for lying? The answer, in a word: neither. 
Earlier in the essay we considered the role idealizations—particularly beautiful ones—
play in the intellectual and moral life of an individual and looked at how a work of art 
(whether it be a painting or a poem) can engage viewers at the intersection of two worlds, 
known variously throughout the history of ideas as: appearance versus reality; becoming 
and being; matter and mind; realism and idealism, and so on. Because humans 
simultaneously occupy both worlds, I agree with those (like Plato) who have argued that 
we dwell in the realm of approximations and find ourselves in the position of having to 
strive toward ideals of perfection that we find continually elude us. Artistic interpretation, 
then, is a balancing act, standing as it were in the liminal space of our experience and re-
presenting elements of that experience to viewers. As such, art is an apt metaphor for 
human relationships and offers a model for how we might approach our most valued 
friendships.  
 In the same way an artist observes the world and then portrays those observations 
after a fashion—interpretively, aesthetically, symbolically—close friends are also in 
possession of a certain kind of knowledge concerning their counterparts. How they 
interpret, represent and reflect back that information is itself an act of creation, mutually 




business of working out their ideal selves. In what remains, I want to make a case for 
treating an online intellectual partnership as a work of art which not only allows but 
encourages honest “approximations” as a way of projecting ideals to strive toward and 
suggesting new ways of being. 
 But first, a story: I have a friend who, during his tenure as a medical student, 
became interested in rock climbing. He was not a climber, although like many 20-
somethings, he had attempted recreational climbing in a gym setting. But it was after 
reading The Night Climbers of Cambridge, a first-hand account of a group of Cambridge 
undergrads who, in the 1930’s formed a clandestine club to free-climb campus buildings 
at night for the sheer thrill of it, that his curiosity was piqued in earnest. As he 
contemplated taking up climbing as a pastime, he visited an outdoor store where an idea 
occurred to him. He purchased a carabiner, attached it prominently to his backpack and 
waited for someone—an actual rock climber—to take notice and ask about it. The plan 
worked brilliantly. An experienced climber did see it, assume my friend was a fellow 
climber and engaged him in conversation. Although he did not overtly lie, owning a 
professional-grade carabiner and displaying it as if it were a piece of gear owned because 
it is used, could arguably be considered posing as a climber. While not much is at stake 
here, it is still the case that an essential feature of the story of how my friend actually 
became a rock climber is the fact that he at first falsely presented himself as if he already 
was one. 
 The method employed by my friend to find his climbing partner illustrates, in 
part, what I mean by approximate honesty. It is not far from true that this aspiring rock 




versions of the sport and has undertaken preliminary research into the skills and 
equipment required. Given this, I would say that insofar as climbing is an ideal he is 
striving toward, this individual was approximately honest in his presentation of himself 
as a “climber.” In Aristotelian terms, one might say he was attempting to become a 
climber by practicing (as best he could, given his level of experience) the actions 
associated with climbing. My account of approximate honesty owes much to Aristotle’s 
description of the way humans achieve arete. As Aristotle explains in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, virtues are good habits formed through accumulated action practiced over time. 
Since moral virtues are not present at birth but must be developed through effort, first we 
identify an ideal—a model person who embodies the virtue we wish to emulate—and 
then through deliberate and consistent acts of choice we attempt to imitate the virtuous 
action until it becomes for us a natural, habituated way of being. In the early stages of 
this process, it may seem as if you are engaging in a kind of deception. You may know, 
for instance, that your generous act of giving your time to help another student is a choice 
you made, despite not feeling particularly inclined toward generosity at the moment. 
Initially, your actions may seem forced or faked; in fact, the quip “fake it till you make 
it,” is a phrase in common parlance that captures this sense that our earliest efforts may 
appear false. 
 Imagine someone who finds, through casual but repeated choices to have a 
cigarette with others, that they increasingly behave as if they are addicted to nicotine. For 
example, they notice cravings for a cigarette which occur outside the normal social 
context wherein this habit first emerged; instead of bumming a smoke off whomever 




an occasional indulgence now feels more necessary and urgent. Now imagine this person 
is aware of these changes and views them with growing disapproval, yet so far, they have 
not made a motion to curb this new habit. Let’s say that recently our new smoker has 
become friends with someone they admire and respect, and through conversations about 
healthy living, virtuous and vicious habits and choices, it becomes clear to our smoker 
that the new friend would certainly view habitual smoking as unhealthy, unpleasant, and 
probably vicious. One evening at a party, the two friends are standing together when 
someone offering a cigarette, asks “Do you smoke?” In the moment, under the influence 
of their own best judgement, aided now by the presence of the friend who has no reason 
to expect otherwise, our new smoker discovers they have finally found the motivation to 
begin to be better, to prioritize health, to be otherwise than they currently are. The 
response? “No. Thank you.”  
 Now there is a sense in which the reply here is neither a true statement (given the 
specific question asked), nor is it an accurate reflection of our smoker’s current status. 
One can imagine the surprise and confusion of an onlooker who happened to be a recent 
smoking buddy: “That’s a lie. You do smoke!” I mention this hypothetical situation as an 
example of how, in the context of friendship, one might have made available to them new 
opportunities to be something different than they currently are. In such a case, at least in 
its burgeoning form, this statement is still a misrepresentation of facts (strictly construed), 
but it may yet prove to be a beautiful lie.  If, moving forward, our smoker exercises the 
determination required to make actual the claim being advanced, then we might say 
instead that what was offered here was not a lie, but rather a bold new truth made 




presents itself as a possibility. The internal dialogue of the moment may run thus: “Am I 
a smoker? Is that what I have become, what I will continue choosing to be? No.” Here the 
lie represents an active decision to change. Striving toward. Not yet, but on the way to 
becoming. Practicing. Walking the path.  
 The challenge, of course, is how best to apply the concept of approximate honesty 
to virtue friendships in such a way that the “approximations” enrich and benefit rather 
than detract from or weaken the relationship. We have already discussed some of the 
conditions that best accommodate a thriving generative friendship. The first has to do 
with distance. Emerson makes a compelling case for the reasoning behind maintaining a 
degree of separation from those with whom we wish to correspond on an intellectual and 
spiritual level. To know our friend’s aesthetic tastes and academic interests, to understand 
their values and aspirations is far more intimate than knowing where they dined for lunch 
on Thursday or their plans for next week. Part of what makes an online relationship an 
ideal candidate for an intellectual partnership is the built-in separation that makes 
focusing on ideas more natural.  
 Earlier, in discussing the benefits of online friendship, Adam Briggle considers a 
relationship that develops between a teacher and a soldier as they exchange letters over 
the course of several months. Due to the distance separating them, Briggle suggests each 
is more open and honest with the other, sharing information they may feel uncomfortable 
revealing to people in their daily lives. While Briggle demonstrates how distance can 
increase what I have called strict honesty, I would like to consider how approximate 




look at how approximate honesty might assist in generating courage in one or both 
correspondents. 
 As the soldier relays thoughts and feelings he experiences as his company 
prepares to engage in conflict, and as he describes details of those events in letters, the 
schoolteacher reacts as one unaccustomed to life on the front lines of war.  To the 
teacher, the sense of calm resolve communicated through the soldier’s words seems 
remarkably courageous, and in his response back to the soldier, he says as much, praising 
the soldier for his courage. Knowing now that his friend holds him in such high esteem, 
the soldier finds he begins thinking of himself as courageous; at the same time, he also 
discovers new motivation to practice small acts of courage. Eventually, he may even 
choose to undertake more difficult tasks which would require even greater courage—
volunteering, perhaps, for a reconnaissance mission.  
 But what if, in his portrayal of himself in the letters, the soldier put on a braver 
face than how he actually felt? What if his choice of words and the details he mentions 
were selected to represent the situation (his views, feelings or actions) in the best possible 
light? What if in the letters to his friend he depicts the response he would, ideally, hope 
for himself, the one to which he aspires? Such cases, I have argued, have a place within 
character friendships as, under the right conditions, they can generate a positive feedback 
loop that produces favorable conditions for growth—in this case for moral development. 
The opportunity for moral growth extends to the other friend as well. Not only is it the 
case that the soldier benefits from the idealized notion of himself (which was partially 




the teacher, too, is engaged in the same mutually exchanged process of self-
representation/self-cultivation and therefore enjoys similar opportunities for growth6.  
 A second condition that helps create a healthy generative friendship has to do 
with motives. For generative friendships to thrive, intention is paramount. If I were to 
name the essence of what separates approximate honesty from vicious misrepresentation, 
it would be intent. In speaking of creative, intellectual and moral aspirations with your 
friend, one must be committed to the project of realizing the ideal with a sincere desire to 
eventually embody the character trait, rather than simply keeping up a ruse. The goal, 
after all is esse quam videri— to be rather than to seem.  
 
1.6 Objections and Conclusion 
 Certainly there are limits to this approach. One should never attempt to pass 
oneself off as having special expertise—professional or otherwise—most critically in 
high-stakes situations. Had my friend taken his pose as a rock climber to the next level 
and pretended he had experience belaying, for instance, and had he and his newfound 
friend decided to tackle a climb at Red River Gorge, both would incur substantial risk. 
Similarly, a pilot, a surgeon, a mental health specialist—without knowledge and proven 
expertise in these fields one should never attempt to fake or exaggerate credentials. These 
are just a few examples, to which common sense will readily supply more. 
 
6 Briggle speculates that, in response to the soldier’s correspondence, the teacher might come to reevaluate 
himself.  He then “faces his daily chores with a greater resolve and begins to appreciate more the simple 
things of a life at peace” (74). Although Briggle’s example assumes what I’ve called strict honesty, one 




 In addition to needing to respect limits on the kinds of claims that can serve as 
appropriate “approximations,” some may object to projecting an idealized version of 
yourself to others because of the potential for creating pressure to be or become 
something you are not (yet). If the high standards set expectations that generate anxiety 
about being “found out” (imposter syndrome) or failing at whatever goal has been set as 
the target, rather than generating the motivation to reach those goals, then the potential 
good of setting the standards has been undermined.  
 Another obstacle might be the draw of wanting to “close the distance”—that is, to 
have a “real” (physical, embodied) relationship with your online friend. If Aristotle is 
correct that what friends desire most of all is being together, then the likelihood this 
would arise is substantial. The question then becomes: if online friends choose to spend 
time together in person, do they risk losing or perhaps spoiling the special nature of the 
relationship? Is Emerson correct in asserting that “the very flower and aroma of the 
flower of each of the beautiful natures disappears as they approach each other” 
(“Friendship”)? 
 Lastly, and most importantly, some may complain that the approximate honesty 
described here amounts to little more than an admission that the relationship is ultimately 
“predicated upon a lie.” I find this to be most serious objection, although it is not without 
qualification and a remedy which I think mitigates this concern. Michael T. McFall has 
expressed concern that long-distance friends who rely on mediated correspondence (text 
based; whether online or traditional written) for communication have “no idea whether 




distance between what is written and what is true. People often lie, and they might even 
unknowingly convey falsehoods” (228).  
 Surely, even under the parameters I have suggested here, the virtue of honesty is 
not without relevance. As mentioned earlier, the objective in approximating truth through 
an idealized lens of how things might be is to expand the way we look at representations 
to include an option for aesthetic interpretation. Such interpretations do not disregard 
honesty, nor do they discount virtue. After all, I am suggesting making honest 
approximations that both respect boundaries and aspire toward truth. This is hardly the 
egregious deception some fear. We find a useful model in revisiting the way Aristotle 
fleshes out his discussion of anger and the associated virtue, mildness. “It is hard to 
define,” he says, “how, against whom, about what and how long we should be angry” 
(NE IV.5). Likewise, the capacity to be truthful is a virtue subject to the particulars of a 
given situation, where proper consideration requires determining how one might be 
honest “‘at the right times,’ in the right way, to the right persons and in the right degree” 
(qtd in Vallor). 
 While the concern motivating Cocking and Matthews’ objection to the highly 
curated presentation of virtual selves in online friendships is legitimate for many cases, in 
the context of generative friendship, some of the things they view as potential problems 
can be seen as opportunities instead. Rather than seeing the “high level of control and 
choice” available in how one presents themselves to a friend in a negative light, with 
generative friendship this aspect can be viewed as a strength. After all, generally 
speaking, being able to produce “much more careful and thought-out responses to 




taking time to develop ideas (one can gather thoughts, research relevant material, map out 
the best way to convey information); moreover, written expression often improves with 
effort and attention, (one is able to craft more beautiful phrases; use more expressive 
language; present ideas more precisely, more concretely). The same can be said of virtual 
communication.  
 It is important to keep in mind here that approximate honesty in the context of 
generative friendship does not involve lying in the sense of being duplicitous, or even 
conjuring a whole-scale misrepresentation of oneself. Instead, a generative friendship is 
an intellectual partnership where two people engage in creating and nurturing an elevated 
sense of themselves and one another that is presented “in a light better than any light that 
ever shone”—not in the sense of something whose value has been mistaken or 
overestimated, but in the way holding a high estimation of something has the potential to 
















CHAPTER 2. LOVE AS NARRATIVE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 One of the most interesting discussions in recent scholarship on love involves a 
question concerning what we are attracted to when we love someone. In seeking to 
understand this, philosophers have offered a variety of answers; some quite specific, 
others broad-ranging and inclusive. Of these, the properties view has proved influential 
due in part to its intuitive appeal. As Simon Keller explains, the properties view “says 
that the question, ‘What justifies your choosing to make her the object of your romantic 
love?’ is a sensible question to ask, and that . . . lovers can, in principle, answer it by 
appealing to a set of the beloved’s properties” (164).   
 In what follows I will consider some of the pros and cons generally associated 
with the properties view, noting especially some recent attempts to reconcile it with 
common objections.  Although each attempt to amend the view has yielded additional 
insights, so far none of these defenses succeeds in capturing the essence of love without 
also generating issues of its own. Part of the reason this is so is because the methodology 
philosophers have employed thus far overwhelmingly focuses on abstract analysis aimed 
at breaking a concept apart into its component elements. While analysis excels at 
identifying essential features and clarifying the particulars of concepts, it generally falls 




an equally important part of understanding. In an attempt to reconcile competing views 
on the nature of love—seemingly at an impasse—this essay suggests viewing love in 
narrative terms as a way to bring these views together. 
 
2.2 Advantages of the Properties View 
 As philosophers, we value objectivity; we want our thinking to be guided by 
reasoning that is logically sound and defensible, and ideally, we expect our actions to 
respond to these reasons. It is no surprise then, that in considering love—this state that 
plays such a central role in our lives—we often apply the same standard. We look for 
reasons in love because we want the things we do because of love to be ordered and 
rational, to make sense—or at the very least not be irrational. Of course, there are notable 
exceptions to this generalization, even amongst those who defend some version of the 
properties view. Robert Solomon, for instance, rejects the ideals of “objectivity, 
impersonality, disinterestedness, universality, respect for evidence and arguments, and so 
on” as being operative in love, and yet still maintains that love has reasons and that those 
reasons are linked to the properties of the beloved (Erotic Love 502). Additionally, 
Laurence Thomas argues that love can be “explained” but not “justified” through 
reference to reasons, thus allowing love to be freed from some problematic implications 
of objectivity in the sphere of love, namely: avoiding the conclusion that there could be 
reasons for love which would compel us to either love or reject someone.   
Besides the commitment to rationality as an intellectual ideal, we want love to 
have reasons in part because love is so risky; a lot is at stake, emotionally speaking, if 




that love should be answerable to external critique; the reasons I give for loving my 
beloved must be concrete and open to an evaluation of their merits. Because of this 
requirement, reasons need to refer to specific features, rather than vague proclamations 
such as “I love him—entirely—just him.” Edyvane makes his point within the context of 
a more detailed argument about unconditional love, concluding that romantic love, at 
least, is best viewed as a conditional commitment which “takes into consideration the 
reasons we might be able to offer to render our commitment intelligible to others” and 
also, I might add, to ourselves (59). 
The first advantage, then, of the properties view is that it provides an account of 
love’s reasons. What are the reasons for my loving someone? To address this question, I 
would turn to observation and evaluation of the beloved, noting qualities, traits, or 
features I value or find desirable, and which are also possessed by my beloved. These 
properties, in principle7, provide me with reasons for loving. Now, let’s take a moment to 
consider a basic version of the competing view, so that we can contrast the two. The 
alternate approach to the properties view claims that what I am attracted to and what I 
ultimately love8 is you: the whole person, the total ‘self’ of my beloved. As appealing as 
this initially sounds, one might well ask, “What does it mean to love the entirety of 
another person?” and “What, exactly, is the ‘self’ to which we would be appealing by 
making such a claim?” Solomon, at least, finds such notions ridiculous: “The idea that the 
object of my love is another person suggests . . . that love is about a person simpliciter, 
the whole person, nothing but and nothing less than the whole person. This is simply 
 
7 I follow Keller here in qualifying this statement in order to acknowledge the possibility that one does not 
always know precisely which properties one is responding to. 




untrue” (Love 133). He continues by suggesting a hypothetical list such as one might 
produce when asked about a particular object of love: “I love you,” he says, “but that may 
be for any number of reasons—because I think you’re beautiful, because you love me 
too, because I admire you in your career, because we cook fine meals together” (133). 
His main argument in this passage is that we neither love with our own ‘entire self,’ nor 
do we love another’s ‘entire self,’ instead our loving only makes sense within the context 
of what he calls a loveworld—the mutually created realm wherein we, as lovers, enact a 
new shared identity.   
Now the point I want to bring out here, that Solomon serves to illustrate, is simply 
that in practice, when asked to provide an account of our reasons for love, more often 
than not we cite the admirable properties of the beloved. Moreover, a lover who cannot 
(does not? will not?) name at least some features of his beloved as reasons for his 
attraction is at risk of seeming lazy, apathetic, or at best, evasive, for his failure to engage 
in this exercise. Indeed, citing anything other than specific properties attributable to the 
beloved, in some sense, would seem vacuous.  To extend this same observation, there is 
also a sense in which we conceive of ourselves as describable most readily in terms of 
what we consider our own set of properties. For example, in responding to the request, 
“Tell me about yourself,” we almost always appeal to concrete properties such as 
physical features (I’m 5’9”) and personality traits (I’m a bit shy), as well as things we 
have done (I’ve hiked 350 miles of the Appalachian Trail). This offers fairly persuasive 
support to the intuition that we tend to think even of ourselves, at least broadly, in terms 




something like “I am an ineffable underlying essence, a total self.” At least it would 
certainly seem odd if they did. 
This brings up another issue. Absent any meaningful explanation of what is meant 
by loving a whole self, it seems we must love the beloved as an instantiation of actual 
traits, qualities, and properties; otherwise, lacking any particular feature(s) that would 
enable us to distinguish the ones we love from others, we would end up having to admit 
that love is arbitrary. After all, if my beloved’s properties do not pick her out, then what 
does? What would be the basis for love, or would we have to say that love has no 
reasons?   
We want there to be reasons. There’s definitely a sense in which we want to be 
loved for at least some of our properties, especially if we consider these properties to be 
essential to, or definitive of, our own sense of self. This is particularly true when we 
consider the traits in question to be personal achievements, things we have striven for—
whether this is a non-moral good such as maintaining a healthy body through 
conscientious eating habits and exercise, or a moral good such as the virtue of generosity. 
In each case, the featured good is one we have made a conscious effort to cultivate, and it 
is not unreasonable to want the struggle involved in its achievement to be recognized and 
appreciated—to have the work we have invested time and energy into to be 
acknowledged—as belonging to us, as our own.   
But not only this.  Another situation where we might wish to have a certain 
feature picked out by our lovers and viewed as inhering in us is when we deem a property 
valuable—worthy of our esteem—and we want that property associated with us. Here it 




disposition), or a trait we have acquired because of good upbringing or education, or even 
a trait we possess by chance (by luck of the genetic draw, for example, a person may be 
athletic or a gifted metaphysician), as long as the trait selected is one we value, and as 
long as we can attach this trait to us as an applicable descriptor, then we are apt to be 
disappointed to find out that our beloved is indifferent toward (unresponsive to) this 
quality—that she would have loved us in the same way even if we had been otherwise is 
no consolation. In this case it seems what is at stake (in addition to the arbitrariness 
mentioned earlier) is the fact that we want our lovers to appreciate what we take to be our 
positive properties, largely because we hope they too will value what we value.   
Simon Keller has argued that when someone loves us it gives us reason to feel 
good about ourselves (perhaps most especially, I might add, when we are loved for traits 
we value). His claim serves to reinforce much of what I have been describing above. 
Here is Keller: 
A large part of what we value about being the object of another’s love is that we 
take it to imply an informed and positive (at least not negative), objective 
evaluation of our character, we think of love as being more than the arbitrary 
expression of a subjective whim.  We want to know that there exist reasons that 
can render this person’s love for us intelligible to others. Where a person’s 
declaration of love appears to lack this element of implicit objective evaluation, 
where it strikes us as being in this sense indiscriminate, we feel that it means less. 
(72) 
To sum up what seems right about the properties view, the following should be 




loved for our properties, it is unclear what motivates love; as a result, love may seem 
arbitrary or indiscriminate; being loved for properties importantly locates value in us as 
bearers of valued properties. 
 
2.3 Downsides of the Properties View 
I will begin by explaining an objection to the properties view that has intuitive 
appeal, mainly because it carries so much emotional and psychological weight. Speaking 
directly to our personal insecurities, this objection asks, “If someone loves me because of 
certain properties I possess, then what happens to that love if/when I change?” This 
objection is particularly powerful because of the inevitability of the condition it 
addresses. The question is not so much whether I will change, but when and how, and to 
what extent will these changes impact my lover’s regard for me? For this reason, the 
objection has the potential to be one that could plague with perpetual worry. Expressing 
this problem, Derek Edyvane says,  
It is somewhat offensive, objectionably contractual and dispassionate to suggest 
that one will love, but only so long as the beloved retains her youthful appearance, 
her sense of humor, his easy-going demeanour [sic] or his impeccable hygiene. Of 
course we hope that our beloved will retain the qualities we adore in him or her, 
but it seems rather unforgiving to suggest that we shall only love so long as he or 
she does.  (59)   
What makes us uncomfortable, it seems, is the fickleness of such love. Taken from a 
slightly different angle, however, the same basic issue (the question of love’s 




this fear of love altering with alteration9 that unconditional love is extolled as an ideal. 
And yet, coming from a standpoint generally sympathetic to the properties account, both 
Edyvane and Keller argue against unconditional love. Better to have love be responsive 
to properties than settle for a love which would give us no reason to value ourselves. So 
the solution to the issue we found objectionable (i.e. fickleness is objectionable, 
unconditional love the solution) is the very thing we must reject to in order to preserve 
what’s valuable in the properties view. The fact that this cuts both ways—or either way 
perhaps—seems like a problem. 
To further complicate things, even though in theory we tend to hold up 
unconditional love as an ideal, in practice, it’s fairly common for significant features of 
the beloved to change and for us, nonetheless, to continue to love. Now this may seem to 
be a good thing. After all, “constancy” (Niko Kolodny’s term for this feature) in love 
saves us from the disparaging charge of fickleness. But can we think of cases where 
constancy might not be so grand?  Consider instances where an individual loves someone 
and that person changes for the worse—say the beloved turns abusive or becomes 
indifferent to his partner. If still, even in the face of such radical and destructive changes 
in the beloved, the lover continues to love, then we would be tempted to call this love not 
just constant, but perhaps even “stubborn” or “foolhardy” (Edyvane 60).   
Now on a standard reading of the properties view, it would seem that in cases like 
the one mentioned above, alteration in the properties of the beloved would cause 
alteration in the love as well (remember: properties are supposed to be reasons for love), 
 
9 This reference to Shakespeare’s “Love is not love which alters when alteration finds” is a favorite among 
those writing on this topic, as are references to Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s sonnet 43: “How do I love 




but as Kolodny rightly points out, in plenty of relationships, such alteration in love never 
occurs (sometimes for ostensibly good reasons, sometimes not so good). Either way, the 
puzzling issue here, as Kolodny notes, is that in cases like this, “The quality view seems 
to imply that love cannot be responsive to its own reasons” (140). 
Another major objection to the properties view concerns the issue of 
replaceability. If love can be understood as an attraction to the properties of the beloved, 
presuming these properties are identifiable, then it seems to follow that if one could 
locate another person who has the same attractive features as the beloved, the lover could, 
without issue, substitute this new person in as a replacement. Further, I see nothing 
preventing the lover from taking on ever more objects of love, as she continues to 
encounter individuals who express the properties she finds desirable.  Viewed another 
way, suppose I compose a list of the properties I find attractive (difficult not to think of 
the proliferation of online dating sites here); now armed with that list, it would seem 
anyone (even a computer) could go out into the world, find suitable matches for the 
properties I seek, and return to me with any number of candidates for my love. If 
properties truly provide reasons for love, as they purport, would it then be irrational of 
me to fail to love any one—or for that matter all—of these candidates? Not only are the 
implications here counter-intuitive, they fly in the face of our actual lived experiences. 
Finally, one might complain that the properties view, with its emphasis on 
objectively identifying features in the loved one is just “too cerebral” to plausibly explain 
the phenomenon of love (Keller 165). Love, we believe, is mysterious, somewhat 
inexplicable, and probably not subject to the same sort of evaluation we might apply 




even when picking out laudable features, can seem impersonal—dangerously close to 
loving the properties rather than the person.   
 
2.4 Modifications  
If the original question of the properties view asks, “Can love be understood as an 
attraction to the qualities of the beloved?” As a tentative answer, I will say “No, I do not 
think love can be adequately understood as an attraction to the properties of the beloved.” 
At least some forms of love (most notably, familial love) do not in any way seem 
motivated by an attraction to properties. But even if we limit our scope to eros/romantic 
love, I find the weight of the objections leveled against this view is persuasive enough to 
be a hindrance to any straightforward acceptance of the account. Nonetheless, the 
fundamental appeal of the properties view remains: it is the strong intuition that when it 
comes to love, the beloved is not simply chosen at random, nor are we attracted willy-
nilly to just anyone. In fact, if anything, the opposite is true. In actuality we are quite 
selective in our loving. Also, it seems disingenuous to deny being attracted to the 
properties of the beloved. Surely the features of the beloved play some role in our loving. 
The question, then, is: How can we preserve what is essentially true about the properties 
view without offending other powerfully held intuitions?   
In defending against objections, several modifications to the property view have 
been considered. Taking each of the above-mentioned objections in turn, I will describe 
and evaluate some of these responses. We begin with the problem of changeability. Will 
my lover still love me even when I change? Edyvane and Keller, arguing in support of 




properties view is that it allows individuals to respond to radical changes in the loved 
one’s character, sometimes, by ceasing to love them. I am reminded of Aristotle’s 
discussion of this topic as it applies to philia in Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics: “But 
if we accept a friend as a good person, and he becomes vicious, and seems so, should we 
still love him? Surely we cannot, if not everything, but only the good is lovable. The bad 
is not lovable, and must not be loved” (341). For Aristotle, that was the easy question, of 
course we cannot love vice. The only issues he saw left to work out involved whether you 
should reject the friend right away or attempt to redeem him; and then, how patient 
should you be in your efforts.   
Now, none of these philosophers are advocating for a rejection of the beloved 
based on trivial or superficial changes, but it seems as if without some additional 
elements added to the account, if you can reject the beloved for becoming vicious, why 
not allow rejection for any sort of change? Here is where I think a distinction in types of 
love would be most useful.10  For instance, in a case where the beloved has become 
hopelessly untrustworthy (an alcoholic perhaps?) the lover might find she no longer loves 
(erai) her partner, and yet still she maintains some level of affection (storge) because of 
the time they have spent together.   
Making an appeal to the history of a love relationship is a strategy that has been 
employed in attempts to reconcile both the problem of changeability and the substitution 
(replaceability) problem. In terms of changeability, one might salvage the properties view 
by appealing to a more nuanced model. Rather than being attracted to and valuing the 
 
10 Aristotle achieves this through distinguishing three types of friendships. Turns out, you can end a 
friendship if your friend is no longer funny…as long as it was mutually understood that the relationship 




personal attributes of the beloved, according to Kolodny’s relationship theory, the lover 
values his relationship with the beloved. Because the love is defined by relational 
aspects, it can more easily accommodate changes in either the lover or the beloved: 
“one’s reason for loving a person is one’s relationship to her: the ongoing history that one 
shares with her” (136). The problem with this theory, I think, is that it fails to provide any 
explanatory account of the initial attraction to a person. Even if relationships provide 
reasons for loving (and I believe they do), we seem only able to avail ourselves of this 
account after the fact—that is after something resembling love has already taken root.  
Prior to this, no relationship existed, so we would still need something like properties to 
explain why the lover picked out this particular subject for his love.   
Perhaps the solution to this lies in separating attraction from loving.  By 
considering these two states as different phenomena, we may come closer to 
understanding how it can be the case that we respond both to the properties in a person 
and to the person himself. For it seems in some way each must be true. If attraction and 
loving are answerable to different sorts of motivations and reasons, then we might be able 
to avoid problems like changeability and substitutability. As an illustration, Kolodny’s 
relationship theory might be strengthened if he could appeal to a phenomenology of 
attraction that in some way responds to features in the beloved. Of course, a well-
developed account of attraction would need to consider both the initial encounter with the 
beloved and attraction as an on-going process as well. Features that initially capture 
attention are not always the ones that keep people together; each new experience with the 
beloved is an opportunity to discover new reasons for attraction that may serve to sustain 




“relational loving” or “shared history” or perhaps even loving the beloved herself. In 
“Love’s Bond,” Robert Nozick nicely summarizes the idea behind what I have suggested 
here: “You can fall in love with someone because of certain characteristics and you can 
continue to delight in these, but eventually you must love the person himself, and not for 
the characteristics, not, at any rate, for any delimited list of them.” (422) 
The list. The replaceability problem begins here, with the notion that if love is 
based on properties, in principle, any person who manifests the desired features could 
stand in just as well as a substitute for the beloved. I said earlier that the “appeal to 
history” modification has been applied in response to both changeability and this 
objection as well. The idea here is that even if we could locate a perfect match for the 
features on my list of desired properties, this identical twin could never actually be 
identical to my beloved because of the “unique contribution [my beloved] has made to 
the narrative of my life” (Edyvane 63). I accept this as a legitimate point; certainly 
referring to a matrix of conversations, shared activities, a particular kind of influence the 
beloved has exerted over the lover’s thoughts, all serves the intended function of 
distinguishing the beloved as unique (and therefore not perfectly replaceable with 
another). However, there may be a potential downside to this.   
Imagine two people: my beloved and his identical-properties-twin. As an adherent 
of the properties view, faced with this choice, I am at a loss as to whom I should love 
(identical-properties-twin, after all, seems quite appealing. Should I replace my beloved 
with twin or perhaps love them both?). Thinking about these two excellent candidates, I 
suddenly remember that I do have a way to distinguish my beloved from his twin—I can 




disappointing material: we fight a lot; perhaps we take boring vacations; there is that time 
he forgot our anniversary… Armed with the revelation afforded me by examining the 
unique contribution my beloved has made to the narrative of my life, I decide to give 
identical-properties-twin a try. I doubt this is how advocates of the shared history view 
planned for this to end. My point is merely to call attention to the underlying assumption 
that a shared history with someone provides a positive reason to love them. As the 
example above demonstrates, this is not necessarily the case.   
Finally, the concern that the properties view ultimately suggests a love of 
properties rather than persons is worth addressing, even though I think we are already 
equipped with resources to handle the objection. Earlier I suggested that a more nuanced 
account of what might be called the trajectory of love seemed like a promising place to 
look for resolution to some common problems facing the properties view. I wondered 
whether considering attraction and loving as having different, but overlapping and 
integrated objects and aims, and if attempting to trace the development (and integration) 
of these two states over time would help clarify these problematic issues. At the 
beginning of this section I said that I did not think love could be adequately understood as 
an attraction to the properties of the beloved. I still believe that. Although the properties 
view describes an essential aspect of love, by itself, it is incomplete.  
 
2.5 A Narrative Approach 
 In the simplest terms, a narrative is a story. More specifically, Robert Roberts 
defines narrative as “a verbal account (oral or written) of a temporally connected series of 




including speech acts.” Regarding these events, Roberts elaborates; narrative “shows 
connections (continuities, changes, antecedents and consequences) between the past, the 
present, and the future. It depicts characters, in their continuities and changes, through 
depiction of their actions, interactions, and reactions (for example emotions), their 
thoughts, desires and intentions at different points in time.” In general, narrative is a 
fundamental way humans make sense of information. By collecting observations and 
noting sequences, patterns and themes, the brain pieces together separate aspects of 
various phenomena and then weaves them into a structure that makes sense (“Narrative 
Ethics”). 
 Among philosophers, the narrative approach has made considerable inroads in the 
field of applied ethics. This is especially the case in medical ethics, where philosophers 
are keen to apply narratives to help patients and caregivers make sense of issues 
surrounding illness and death. Judging from the number of journal articles written on this 
topic over the past five years, a new subset of narrative ethics seems to be emerging. 
Additionally, interest in narrative is crossing over into the realm of (theoretical) 
normative ethics as well. In her book Love’s Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum takes up the 
topic, arguing that a “coordination between philosophical and narrative presentations of 
the virtues and vices is needed.”   
 In his 2012 article “Narrative Ethics,” Robert Roberts explains how philosophical 
analysis and literary description each have strong suits—areas of expertise wherein they 
excel— and he suggests that by working in tandem, these two approaches can generate a 
more complete and insightful whole: “Some of the best literature displays moral (and 




philosophy brings to its description a schematic precision that narrative alone cannot 
supply” (“Narrative Ethics”). Roberts’ own article focuses on the intersection between 
the theoretical framework of virtue ethics and literary narratives. He considers several 
passages in works by Jane Austen, Henry James and George Eliot where characters are 
astutely described by the author in ways that illuminate important features of the moral 
life, including virtuous and vicious behaviors. Roberts believes that examination of 
insightfully composed descriptions such as these can serve to ground otherwise abstract 
ethical theories and provide an effective tool philosophers can use to convey ideas to 
readers, thus enabling them to better translate such knowledge into ethical practice. 
 In the same way narrative has been useful in revealing points of intersection 
among ideas that seem unrelated or even at odds with one another in the fields of medical 
ethics and virtue ethics, I think applying a narrative approach to the analysis of love 
offers several advantages. What happens if instead of trying to abstract and analyze 
various aspects of love in isolation—attempts to define love, for example, or to locate 
precisely the features we are attracted to when we love someone—we consider ways in 
which the phenomenon of love functions as a narrative whole? Will this help show how 
separate, seemingly unrelated pieces fit together?  
 The primary advantage of viewing love as a narrative is the unification of 
competing explanatory theories. While each of the ways of analyzing love have 
something legitimate to offer, as stand-alone theories they are inadequate. In what 
follows I want to show how various analytical approaches considered previously in the 
essay are not fundamentally in conflict with one another—one is not wrong while the 




phenomenon of love. Viewing love in narrative terms pushes back against the reductivist 
tendencies of some analytical methods and provides a way to conceive of the some of the 
features of love in continuity with one another. Ideally, this approach has the added virtue 
of more accurately reflecting our lived experience. 
 
2.6 Love as a Narrative 
 Even though there are innumerable ways to tell a story, generally speaking stories 
share common features, like structural patterns (exposition-rising action-climax-falling 
action-denouement), devices (narrator, conflict, symbolism), and components (character, 
setting, theme).  In this section, we will consider several traditional narrative elements 
and how they might fit into and enhance existing theories of love, with special attention 
given to the properties view and modifications it has precipitated. 
2.6.1 Plot  
 The plot—or temporal sequence of events that comprises the action of the story—
provides the essential structure of a story and enables the audience to locate, trace and 
contextualize events as they are experienced by characters over time. Viewing a love 
relationship in terms of a narrative arc developed through a series of actions, thoughts, 
emotions, and motivations unfolding within the context of an overarching storyline offers 
insight into the history of the relationship—how it began, developed, weathered 
challenges, grew in intimacy or deteriorated and declined. Not all plots progress in a 
linear fashion (Evelyn Waugh’s novel Brideshead Revisited opens with Charles Ryder 




concludes with a return to the ‘present day’); nonetheless, picking out certain 
chronological markers can provide a framework through which to conceptualize 
relationships.  
 For instance, identifying an important event that serves as the initial contact 
between two people, the pre-meeting reference to someone, or an overheard conversation 
which sets the stage for an eventual interchange—these ‘first encounters’ and the follow-
up sequence it generates make up what might be called the Beginning of a relationship.  
In order to understand Charles’ relationship with Julia Flyte—their troubled first go-
round at love, an extramarital affair when they are reunited after a lengthy separation, 
their attempt to forge a committed long-term union—one must piece together an account 
of a middle-class young man who is intrigued by a school mate’s flamboyant charisma 
and who is drawn into a decades-long entanglement with a wealthy Catholic family. This 
love story begins, oddly enough, when Julia’s brother Sebastian vomits into a ground 
floor window of Charles’ room. 
 The properties that first attract Charles to Sebastian (and vice versa), such as 
personality traits and dispositions, contribute to a meaningful account of the subsequent 
intimacy that develops between them. But so do their interactions with other characters, 
and details from the family history of each. As we come to understand these past 
experiences and add them to the growing number of situations we can observe, we move 
toward a more comprehensive account of how an erotically charged friendship develops 
into an eventual love affair with Sebastian’s sister Julia. In a narrative framework, this is 
the Middle or developmental period of the love story that depicts the relationship growing 




resolution as we near the climax or narrative End, which may materialize as a failed 
relationship, or death, or perhaps with the suggestion of perpetuation—a cycling back to 
the beginning, or hints that some aspect of the relationship continues on though offspring 
(in the form of children, or accomplishments, or a look at those impacted by the legacy of 
the union). Thus, viewing love as a complex relationship unfolding within a narrative plot 
sequence combines elements from both the properties view and also the relational/shared 
history view. 
2.6.2 Character  
 In any story, characters play a central role; they are the figures around whom the 
events of the story unfold. Whether they are active agents, moving, gesturing, and 
performing deeds, or passive recipients who experience consequences initiated by others, 
without characters there would be no story to relate. In the case of a love narrative, 
thinking of the lover and the beloved (minimally) as characters who are themselves 
individuals with unique personal histories, intellectual and emotional backgrounds, 
learned and dispositional behavioral patterns, and skill sets—in addition to an extensive 
list of physical attributes—provides a starting place for understanding both the nature of 
attraction and the reasons that animate action as it unfolds throughout the course of a 
relationship. Already we can see how analytical attempts to define love as an attraction 
to properties, and then isolate it from the complex ways in which these individuals as 
characters can generate a shared life together can misfire. Recall that within the context 
of abstract analytical reasoning, the above options are presented as opposing views. 
 When two people meet and take an interest in one another, they have a natural 




exchanging personal histories. In Sheldon Vanauken’s book A Severe Mercy, the couple 
in the story take this notion to an extreme. So intent are Davy and Van—two young 
people who meet and fall in love—to know and understand one another that they make 
lists of all the books they have read and places they visited before they met. Lists in hand, 
they decide to go back and experience these things together, with the ultimate goal being 
to create, as much as possible, a sense of shared history which they hope will stand as a 
“shining barrier” between themselves (in the form of this new, unified entity) and the 
outside world. This autobiographical account of Vanauken’s marriage to Jean Davis is a 
good example of the relational view of love Niko Kolodny advocates for. 
 But as mentioned earlier, the accumulated experiences that comprise who we are 
as persons, as characters—including childhood adventures and mishaps, stories told 
about you by family members and friends—when taken into consideration, these sub-
narratives help account for various likes and dislikes, confidences and insecurities, and 
strengths and weaknesses. Such information, when disclosed (whether “read” off of us by 
others’ observations, or deliberately revealed) plays a role in the phenomenon of 
attraction in a way that is different from the ongoing, developmental quality of a 
relationship. 
 To take this a step further: even though observing a person’s actions does provide 
some information about qualities they possess, the actions themselves are manifestations 
of something deeper within. As such, observing a person’s actions over time (what might 
be called the narrative advantage) leads to accumulated knowledge, and with it a much 




disconnected actions. A list of properties alone—however long—can never fully express 
a person’s core being.  
 Julia Flyte is an interesting example of someone whose character arc presents a 
series of conflicted actions ultimately tied to the core struggle she experiences. Even 
though she loves Charles, he is a professed agnostic, and since she is expected to marry a 
Catholic, she makes a hurried match with Rex Mottram who has agreed to convert. 
Unsurprisingly, the union is fraught, and Julia eventually violates social and religious 
norms by engaging in an affair with Charles. At first, the affair seems to offer Julia an 
opportunity to finally be happy: she is reunited with a man she loves; she emancipates 
herself from a strained marriage, and at the same time has mapped out a way to escape an 
overbearing family dynamic. And yet, at the climax of the story, just as Julia seems 
poised to finally break free, she instead chooses to give up her relationship with Charles 
and remain at home in order to fulfill what she takes to be her duty to family and religion 
(which, in this case are inextricably linked).   
 An attempt to describe Julia in terms of the properties displayed through her 
actions might yield a list of antithetical traits such as rebellious and fiercely independent, 
alongside conforming and constrained. Thus, it seems the best way to understand Julia is 
to consider the whole—her actions, motivations, and core disposition—as it unfolds over 
time within the narrative context of her experiences. On this view, a sense of continuity is 
still possible even when changes occur over time (as they will). The various traits one 
might associate with Julia’s actions alter—sometimes in surprising ways—as she 
navigates her relationship with Charles. Ultimately, viewing someone in terms of 




Here, a narrative framework allows for a sense of openness and offers a more 
comprehensive account, because—as Julia’s character arc demonstrates—even radical 
change is possible. 
2.6.3 Narrator  
 Just as every story is told from a point of view—whether it be first person, second 
person, or a third person omniscient narrator—the story of a particular love will also be 
recounted within the context of a given perspective. Considering the fact that no two 
people would report details of a series of events in the exact same way, even the selection 
process itself is indicative of what the person telling the story finds important. Because of 
this, salient features will vary depending on the narrative perspective. Although the 
narrator might also be a character in the story, this need not be the case. The most 
comprehensive narrative of love would be a multi-perspective story told from at least two 
points of view: the lover and the beloved. It is not uncommon in the context of describing 
an event—an argument for instance—that the motivations, reasons for action, and 
interpretation given by one party to the conflict will differ substantially from the account 
as understood and provided by the other. In cases like this, understanding love in terms of 
reasons that are concrete and open to an evaluation allows space and distance to weigh 
those reasons. One of the factors cited by Derek Edyvane in defense of love being 
grounded in reasons (which are themselves based on qualities) is just this: it enables the 
account of love to be answerable to external critique.  
 For as much as Sheldon Vanauken and Jean Davis wished to cordon themselves 
off from the rest of the world and live in an exclusive community of their own creation, 




are their lives. When love is viewed as an interconnected whole comprised of multiple, 
varying perspectives that sometimes diverge, sometimes converge, and frequently 
overlap and intersect one another, these additional narrative perspectives will add 
dimension, offer correctives, and (at least in principle) provide an objective outsider’s 
view that may offer wisdom and insight otherwise unavailable to those experiencing 
events at close range. 
2.6.4 Setting  
 Insofar as location and situational features provide a context under which a story 
unfolds, dramatic setting contributes something essential to the meaning of narratives. 
The fact that two people first encounter one another while walking alone in a park; that 
they continue to pass on subsequent days at around the same time; that they ultimately 
begin speaking because of intersecting activity at the park, means that this particular 
location plays a central role in the narrative the couple’s shared life. While location itself 
is important, other factors associated with place—such as weather, cultural traditions and 
pressures, activities available for the couple to engage in, geographical and manmade 
features of the landscape, whether the community is urban or rural, crowded or isolated—
help define and conscribe the conditions for meaning within the narrative. 
 As an example of the way the setting of an event gives rise to meaning within a 
particular context, in After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre imagines a man engaging in the 
action of tending a garden. If someone were to ask or attempt to explain what he is 
“doing,” MacIntyre suggests that a wide variety of answers may be given, all of them true 
and plausible within differing contexts. It may be said, for instance, that he is: 




(206). The kind of answer that would make sense in a given situation is dependent on the 
context—or setting—under which the behavior takes place. MacIntyre illustrates this 
point by contrasting two contexts: one where it is autumn and the man is checking off 
late-season garden chores, and another where his wife wishes he would get out and 
exercise more. In one case the man’s action is “situated in an annual cycle of domestic 
activity,” where in the other, it occurs within the “narrative history of a marriage” (206). 
Each setting carries with it a different set of expectations, motivations and intentions, and 
because of this, MacIntyre argues that human actions can only be understood as taking 
place within a context: “a setting has a history, a history within which the histories of 
individual agents not only are, but have to be, situated, just because without the setting 
and its changes through time the history of the individual agent and his changes through 
time will be unintelligible” (206-7). 
 If MacIntyre is correct and the meaning of actions, events, and conversations 
alters within the context of the setting, then love cannot be adequately understood apart 
from its locatedness within a particular narrative framework. Consider two people who 
have known each other since childhood, who may have grown up within close proximity 
of one another. Perhaps they rode bicycles on the same streets and romped in the woods 
behind the same neighborhood school—these two individuals share a sense of place, a 
common history that serves as a framework for later experiences together. Contrast this 
with a couple whose initial meeting takes place in a foreign country, far away from their 
respective lives. Although their encounter occurs at a time in each of their lives when 
they are away from home for the first time, just getting a taste of independence, we can 




be from opposite ends of the country, and hold significantly differing political views, yet 
still find common ground upon which to build a relationship. Whatever the elements of a 
couple’s story happen to be, it is certain they would have played out differently had they 
taken place elsewhere, in an altered context, and under different circumstantial stimuli. 
2.6.5 Theme  
 In literature, themes are main, underlying ideas that get established through 
significant actions or events, which are often repeated in varying circumstances 
throughout the narrative. Within the context of love, themes might include cycles that get 
repeated; issues that reoccur with some regularity, behavior and emotional patterns that 
emerge within an array of events one might recount in creating a narrative arc: The 
idealist dreamer who conjures grand visions for the practically-minded accomplisher to 
hammer out and make possible; The couple who researches and deliberates, endlessly 
weighing pros and cons before making decisions, only to find their hesitation frequently 
results in missed opportunities; The restless lover who changes jobs and moves to a new 
location every couple of years, and the accommodating beloved who is content to follow. 
Each of the above vignettes describes a behavioral pattern that could develop over time, 
and to the extent that it meaningfully impacts the relationship as such, can be said to be a 
theme of that relationship.  
 In the same way that our actions manifest patterns, speech—including topics of 
conversation, use of particular words and phrases and the expression of important ideas—
may as well. It is not unusual in the course of a long-term relationship for partners to feel 
a kind of deja vu—as if they have already had a conversation before. Sometimes this 




observes that the Browns haven’t been on vacation in two years— “Yes, precisely. We 
always say that having animals ties people down!” Or, the issue may instead be a 
recurring point of contention in the relationship, representing an unresolved issue that 
resurfaces whenever a particular stimulus is introduced: “The Browns have a new puppy; 
it’s so much fun for the kids. Why can’t we get one too? You always say that, but…”  
Here ideas (sometimes even exact phrases) from past conversations reemerge and are 
recognized as expressing themes that have become significant to the couple’s shared 
experience. 
 While the conversations, actions and events from which themes arise are temporal 
episodes in an unfolding plot, the sequence of events is not the same as the themes which 
emerge out of it. Even so, one cannot get hold of these themes without simultaneously 
considering the narrative sequence within which they are situated. The two are 
inextricably linked. Moreover, actions (and conversations, for that matter) are connected 
to personal properties—strengths, weaknesses, talents, dispositions—in the same way. 
The dreaming of the idealistic planner and her speech describing the features of “the 
perfect outdoor concert” arise from her idealistic disposition; in the same way the 
hedging, foot-dragging and naysaying of the hesitant person grows out of an overly 
cautious personality. None of this happens in isolation, and the interconnectedness of 
personality, speech and action are most clearly comprehended through consideration of 
the narrative details tying all this together. 
 Similarly, viewing love as exemplifying themes in the context of an overarching 
narrative allows equal weight to be given to the properties view (the lover values the 




beloved), and the entire person view (the lover is attracted to the ‘entire self’ of the 
beloved) because it makes love intelligible as having grown out of a particular setting, 
having developed a set of themes that can be understood only in terms of a relationship 
that both comes from a history (the setting) and is evolving through shared activity, 




 When seeking to understand the nature of love—this most elusive human 
condition—philosophers’ work in attempting to define it concretely and in examining 
specific aspects in order to identify essential features has done much to bring us closer to 
understanding. At the same time however, when applied to the case of love, these 
analytical methods have produced a theoretical stalemate. An adequate account of love 
would need to include an acknowledgment of the interconnectedness of the stages and 
development of love, the forms it takes, and what it is responding to. Because of this, I 
have suggested it may be useful to think of love in narrative terms, and to apply the 
conceptual framework—the structure and elements—of storytelling as a way of unifying 
diverging theoretical views. 
 Even so, this approach is subject to certain limitations. For one thing, by its very 
nature a holistic account like this is not going to be able to provide precise, analytical 
assessments such as formulating a definition of love, or picking out its essential features. 
Furthermore, we will not attempt to identify that which would separate narratives of love 




here is not intended to apply exclusively to love (even in its many forms). Nearly all 
human experience can be framed in terms of narrative structure; this means that this 
method could be meaningfully applied toward enterprises as diverse as finding 
satisfaction in vocation or work, understanding the role of failure and loss, or tracing how 
we construct the notion of family. But the fact that narrative could be used to generate a 
more complete understanding of many aspects of human experience is a strength rather 
than a weakness of the approach. This suggests, I think, that despite the limitations 
mentioned above, there is still a place for narrative as a companion to philosophical 
analysis. While argument plays an indispensable role in the work of philosophy aimed at 
understanding the nature of love, the holistic view offered by narrative can be used to 
resolve some of the competing claims generated through analysis. Thus, rather than 
attempting to seek answers using analysis alone, philosophers would do well to 
acknowledge that these two approaches should be considered together, as complementary 












CHAPTER 3. ATTRACTION AS RECOGNITION: EROS, FRIENDSHIP, AND THE 
DUAL NATURE OF INTIMACY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In a letter to his friend Lucilius, Seneca responds to Lucilius’ hesitancy to confide 
in another man whom he refers to as his friend: “You have sent me a letter by the hand of 
a ‘friend’ of yours, as you call him. And then in the next sentence you warn me to avoid 
discussing your affairs freely with him, since you are not even in the habit of doing so 
yourself.” Immediately following this, Seneca rightly points out to Lucilius that if he 
feels he cannot trust this man, it would appear that the man is not, in fact, a true friend. 
As the letter continues, Seneca offers Lucilius some advice concerning how one should 
approach the process of determining whether or not another person is a genuine friend: 
“Certainly you should discuss everything with a friend; but before you do so, discuss in 
your mind the man himself. After friendship is formed you must trust, but before that you 
must judge.” A few lines later, Seneca cautions, “Think for a long time whether or not 
you should admit a given person to your friendship” (34-35, italics mine). 
Notable in the passages above is the emphasis Seneca places on the rational 
element involved in even the earliest stages of friendship formation. His advice to 
Lucilius stresses thinking, weighing merits, judgment and choosing, suggesting that 
interpersonal relationships are both initiated by and structured primarily as activities of 




originates in the intellect, and is unsurprising given the primacy allotted to cognitive 
action in Stoic tradition.  
Perhaps an even more extreme case of this is expressed by Epictetus, whose 
Encheiridion suggests such impersonal and counterintuitive attitudes concerning how one 
should approach intimate relationships that some have questioned whether embracing 
Stoicism would even allow for the existence of love11. For example, several passages in 
Encheiridion offer advice about how one might manage the loss of something treasured. 
Epictetus begins with a sensible suggestion: “In the case of everything attractive or useful 
or that you are fond of, remember to say just what sort of thing it is, beginning with the 
least little things. If you are fond of a jug, say ‘I am fond of a jug!’ For then when it is 
broken you will not be upset” (#3). The idea here is that, from a rational standpoint, it 
makes sense to be mindful that material objects—by their very nature—are liable to 
break. Knowing this, we should expect eventual damage or loss as likely, and this 
rational awareness can help mitigate our sense of loss. Seems reasonable enough. But 
then Epictetus continues with this non sequitur: “If you kiss your child or your wife, say 
you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be upset” (#3). Setting aside 
the weak analogy here (there are relevant dissimilarities between losing a material 
possession and the loss of life, especially death of a loved one), what stands out is the 
rationale informing Epictetus’ position. What enables him to dismiss loss of life with the 
same aplomb as breaking a jug is his belief that human emotions are subject to rational 
control. That one can and should exercise such control is a recurring theme throughout 
 
11 See Stephens, William O. Can a Stoic Love?” Sex, Love, and Friendship: Studies of the Society for the 




the Encheiridion. On the outset, “impulses, desires and aversions” are listed among 
things that, according to Epictetus, are “up to us” (#1). At best, they should be relegated 
to the status of being extraneous; at worst, they are menacing and should be stamped out. 
His advice, after all is to “eliminate desire completely” (#4). Elsewhere he explains, 
“what upsets people is not things themselves but their judgements about the things” (#5, 
italics mine). Common throughout is Epictetus’ insistence on the primacy of reason over 
both embodied experience and the emotions.  
 Epictetus’ version of Stoicism encourages what many consider to be a radical 
dissociation of the body from the mind and its emotional responses that seems incoherent 
at times. If the body falls under the category of “things not up to us,” while emotions are 
listed among things we can control—presumably through deliberate exercise of the 
will—both are essentially rendered irrelevant with respect to the role commanded by the 
rational, deciding self. At the very least, his insistence that one’s own body and certain 
types of emotions are separate from—or external to—the essential self cultivates a 
reductive approach to human experience. As with Seneca, Epictetus’ view of 
interpersonal relationships is grounded in the assumption that relationships (like 
friendship) are comprised and maintained through a series of rational judgements and 
chosen actions which are determined and managed irrespective of bodies.   
 In what follows, I want to challenge this basic claim. To do so, first we will need 
to expose commonly held views concerning the role of the individual—more precisely, 
the deliberative individual—in friendship formation; here we will see that in large part, 
common opinion maintains that friendship is a relationship that takes a particular 




scrutiny, we will attend to the phenomenon of attraction in order to determine the role it 
plays in bringing, and ultimately keeping, people together. Here I will suggest a 
descriptive account of attraction as a kind of mutual recognition that both captures people 
and engages them in a process of discovery. Drawing on basic insights from John 
Russon’s work in the phenomenology of human experience, I show how intimacy is 
dynamically developed through recognition of one’s own dually characterized position of 
groundedness and openness with respect to the other. Recent work by Linda Zagzebski, 
Nancy Sherman, and others offers corroborative views on the essential role the body 
plays in communicating information about ourselves and others. Finally, I describe how 
attraction can be characterized in terms of the recognition of shared values, including 
moral, intellectual and aesthetic values. 
 
3.2 The Phenomenon of Attraction 
 When you walk along the bustling sidewalks of a large city, hundreds of people 
come into view, appear for a moment, and then stream past. Likewise, to whatever degree 
you are noticed, you are to them an unfamiliar face among the many bodies passing by. 
This experience of the flow of others with whom you will most likely never have contact, 
imparts a sense of breadth, of the vastness of the human community you partake in. In 
some social situations, though, the nature of the encounter with others is altered in such a 
way that allows for this steady current to calm and collect into pools; interaction then 
becomes more localized and thus potentially more navigable. While attending a 




whom, by virtue of their presence at this event, have indicated a degree of shared 
interests, and yet, despite this commonality, you may still experience the majority of your 
encounters with these new people as generally uniform in nature.   
Most estimate the number of people an individual is likely to meet over the course 
of a lifetime in the tens of thousands, and yet sociologists who study the dynamics of 
social networking claim that one can expect to form relations of some sort—ranging in 
intimacy from casual acquaintances all the way up to close friends—with between 300 
and 3,000 of these people at a given time (Marlow). When you amend the data to include 
only those with whom one is cognitively and practically capable of maintaining a 
relationship—in terms of remembering names and faces and keeping track of basic 
personal information and content related to the interconnectedness of the web—the 
number drops to 150. So special is this number, in fact, that it has its own name: 
Dunbar’s number. And yet, when surveyed about the number of people with whom they 
believed they could share anything, the field narrows sharply, with the average American 
claiming only three close friends (Marsden, cited in Marlow). Given the large number of 
people we make contact with throughout our lives, especially when compared to the 
small number of those with whom we nurture meaningful relationships, questions arise: 
What is it about these particular people that attracted our attention in the first place, that 
caused them to stand out amid a sea of others? What about them (and us) accounts for the 
endurance of our most significant relationships? 
One version of the story goes like this: generally speaking, we choose our friends. 
I meet someone, gather data about them through a kind of detached observation, and then 




deliberation until prepared to fully engage someone—is the one advocated by Seneca. 
But it is also an account of friendship germination that is widely endorsed by 
contemporary opinion as well. We find evidence of this view in the fact that we often 
speak of individuals as either praiseworthy or culpable based on an evaluation of the 
“friends they choose.” An ample collection of wisdom literature, parables and wise 
sayings on this topic can be found instructing people concerning the importance of 
reasoned consideration regarding the people with whom they hold company. Common to 
many of these cautionary tales is the emphasis on the exclusivity of the relationship—
which is often couched in terms of personal responsibility—and on friendship as 
fundamentally driven by rational decision-making. Thus, failures in friendship are 
failures of deliberation. 
While it is certainly true that we think about and ultimately make choices with 
regards to the people we associate with, the overwhelming tendency is to prejudice the 
rational element as if it were the only legitimate influence that draws people together. But 
does this Stoic ‘discussion in the mind’ adequately capture the phenomenon of attraction? 
What about people whose experiences of relationship initiations evince a conspicuous 
absence of rational deliberation? Certainly it is not altogether uncommon for individuals 
to report incidences of ‘love at first sight,’ or being inexplicably drawn to a new 
acquaintance, or feeling immediately at ease in the presence of a person who is largely 
unknown to them. On first consideration, such accounts might strike one as shallow, 
hasty assessments that cannot possibly rest upon a solid foundation. After all, we might 
think (and justifiably so) that profound, enduring love relationships such as intimate 




invested in commitment, fidelity and the binding strength of cumulative, shared 
experiences than they are concerned with initial impressions. Moreover, given the current 
culture of appearance, with its attendant dysfunctional emphasis placed on projecting 
oneself as through a façade of cosmetics, fashion, surgical enhancements, and non-
healthy dieting or appearance-driven exercise, we might be justly skeptical of this 
purportedly instant magnetism as tending to be contrived or inauthentic.   
And yet, were we to examine more closely these testimonies, we may discover 
that rather than being evidence of ungrounded, superficial judgments about potential 
compatibility, such phenomena might instead suggest that there is quite a bit about 
ourselves that we unconsciously project through our bodies. Information about the history 
of our interpersonal contacts (situations that embarrass us, circumstances where we feel 
comfortable), accumulated years of evidence describing the lived-dynamic of our familial 
interactions (“I fear this, but am confident here”)—all this we house physically, 
externally, in our bodies. To some extent this information about us does seem apparent: 
perhaps it is revealed in our posture, in gestures, or in facial expressions. If this is true, 
then details such as these may be sensually available to be read and understood, to be 
perceived by those who, because of their own past histories, are themselves keenly—
though probably equally unconsciously—attuned to noticing and taking up such signs.   
In Anne Carson’s poetic novel, Autobiography of Red, the narrator recounts the 
story of the protagonist Geryon’s first encounter with Herakles, the young man who later 
becomes his lover. Their chance meeting occurs at a busy bus depot where travelers are 
streaming on and off vehicles, depositing and gathering passengers before heading off 




circumstance of Geryon’s rounding a corner and nearly colliding into Herakles as he 
steps off the bus:  
The world poured back and forth between their eyes once or twice. / Other people  
 wishing to disembark the bus from New Mexico / were jamming up behind  
 Herakles who had stopped on the bottom step with his suitcase in one hand /  
 trying to tuck in his shirt with the other.  Do you have change for a dollar? /  
 Geryon heard Geryon say. / No. Herakles stared straight at Geryon.  But I’ll give  
 you a quarter for free. (39) 
Significantly, Carson describes the above experience as one of mutual identification and 
of epiphany. “They were two superior eels at the bottom of the tank,” she writes, “and 
they recognized each other like italics.” Of Geryon’s own experience, the narrator 
proclaims, “It was one of those moments that is the opposite of blindness” (39). Both 
images invoked here to describe the momentous occasion of this starkly physical meeting 
depict the phenomenon in terms of recognition: first as a kind of revelatory seeing, then 
as an appearing—the way an object appears to one as standing out from an indistinct 
background. Each is an apt expression of the experience of erotic attraction.   
In Bearing Witness to Epiphany: Persons, Things and the Nature of Erotic Life, 
John Russon defines erotic experience as “the fundamental bodily recognition of the 
presence of another person as a person” whose way of being in the world arrests our 
attention and draws us with a kind of “magnetism,” as if we are being summoned. At the 




engagement), including a desire for the other to reciprocate our desiring12 (Bearing 
Witness 73-77). Three particulars are noteworthy here. First, that Russon’s account of the 
erotic has its foundation in the body. While this may seem an obvious feature to mention, 
a point that follows from this might appear somewhat less evident—at least judging from 
the fact that it typically gets overlooked: namely, that all human experience is 
fundamentally embodied experience. This bears upon our study because instead of 
formulating the phenomenon of attraction as a kind of intellectual response to data 
evaluated within our minds, Russon reminds us that as embodied beings, human sexuality 
“permeates all our experience” (75). The meaningful implication here is that human 
relational responses of attraction and repulsion can never be adequately understood solely 
or even primarily in terms of rationality.  Furthermore, given the centrality of bodily 
experience, even relationships that may have previously seemed abstractly distanced 
from physical considerations (so-called merely ‘Platonic’ friendships come to mind) are 
shown, on this view, to be as erotic in nature as those attractions we might traditionally 
refer to as sexual. 
The second point to highlight about erotic experience is its characterization as a 
type of recognition. Interestingly, both Carson’s portrayal of Geryon and Herakles’ love 
affair and Russon’s designation of erotic experience have in common the fact that each 
employs the verb ‘recognize’ in order to describe the phenomenon of attraction. In each 
case, the choice of recognition as a predicate is potentially rather complex due to the 
richly nuanced ways in which we frequently make use of the word. ‘Recognition,’ in a 
 
12 “My erotic interest in another is the desire that my attraction for this other be welcomed and reciprocated 




very basic sense, refers to an acknowledgement or acceptance (to recognize a person as a 
member of an organization; to recognize a point in an argument); but it can also mean to 
set apart (to be awarded recognition with an honor). Often, recognition involves a 
discovery or epiphany; recognition occurs when a thing reveals itself to us and we take 
notice (to finally recognize the value of hard work). In naming the “bodily recognition of 
the presence of another person” an erotic experience, Russon likely intends to summon 
each of these various connotations. With our bodies we acknowledge and accept the 
presence of another; through our bodies we experience another as revealed to us; our 
bodies are the sites which allow for the discovery of other bodies. According to Russon, 
interpersonal relationships involve a noticing posture that he calls “erotic perception,” 
which facilitates (and perhaps even compels) a kind of revelatory seeing which “draws us 
to a focus on individual persons in their detachment from others” (75). Thus, to call my 
experience of a person ‘erotic’ suggests that my gaining awareness of that person as just 
that particular individual is to have them stand out to me, as when an italicized word or 
phrase in the text comes forward on the page, distinct and separate from the many other 
words also recorded there.   
But to say that Geryon and Herakles “recognized each other like italics” is to 
insist on quite a bit more than what is afforded by the relatively simple notion that the 
other appears as separate and distinct. If we accept the premise that erotic experience is a 
particular kind of perception, then we should also take care to specify precisely what it is 
that erotic attraction notices.  For Russon, the momentous realization that erotic 
experience brings about is the recognition that the other is actually present in oneself. 




Taken together with the first two observations, this third insight gleaned from Russon’s 
discussion of erotic experience, points out a dynamic tension inherent in interpersonal 
relationships. On the one hand, inasmuch as I experience a person as a person, I must 
recognize them as separate from both me and everyone else; yet on the other hand, to 
respond to a person with recognition is to view them in terms of identity, to see them as 
importantly in me.13 Perhaps the most common usage for the word ‘recognize’ is as a 
form of identification:  to recognize a face is to place it, to remember that one has 
encountered it before. Here re-cognition is a kind of re-thinking, where thinking refers to 
a process of locating a stimulus within the known framework of one’s experience. It is a 
tapping into or gaining access to something familiar, something already known. 
Necessarily, such identification engages memory; and so to recognize is to come to know 
again, to identify as part of one’s previous experience. This notion of recognition-as-
identification is very much the sense to which Carson appeals in the quote above.  
Geryon and Herakles stand-out to one another, to be sure, but they do so by virtue of 
identity rather than separateness; each recognizes in the other a similar kind: “They were 
two superior eels at the bottom of the tank.” 
Having first suggested the inadequacy of a common Stoic view of friendship—
namely, that it emerges out of a stance of detached observation and rational reflection on 
a person’s merits—we moved next to consider an alternate view: that friendship 
originates in erotic attraction. We characterized this attraction as being fundamentally of 
the body, and as exhibiting two distinct forms of recognition: one which viewed the other 
 
13 “In me” both in the sense of a desire for nearness and touch that originates in my body as a physical urge, 
and also in the sense that the physical presence of the other communicates—or reflects back to me—




as essentially separate, and a second that acknowledged the extent to which self and other 
are essentially entwined. Because both forms of recognition figure as operative in 
interpersonal relationships, we will now attempt to examine in greater detail the role that 
erotic recognition plays in the formation and subsequent development of close friendship. 
 
3.3 The Dual Nature of Intimacy: Recognizing the Other as Self and 
the Other as Other 
 When Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics that a decent a man will be 
“related to his friend as he is to himself, since the friend is another himself,” at least two 
ways of taking up the meaning of the phrase ‘another himself’ come to mind (IX. 6). 
First, another self might mean ‘another who is very like oneself.’ As indicated earlier, the 
notion of likeness is closely linked to the phenomenon of recognition and it is our task to 
demonstrate how recognition of the other as essentially like oneself plays an 
indispensable role in bringing people together. In contrast, a second way one could 
interpret Aristotle’s phrase involves viewing ‘another self’ not as an expression of the 
similarity between a person and his friend, but instead as a reference to experiencing the 
other as markedly different, as a potentially quite other manifestation of oneself. This 
sense of the other as other will prove to be an equally essential element of friendship. In 
fact, both senses—of groundedness in the familiar and of openness through the 
unfamiliar—are vital to intimacy. In what follows we will consider each in turn.  
Previously, we established the body as the central site of erotic attraction. In 




body is double. It is itself, but it is itself only by being beyond itself” (Bearing Witness, 
31). Developing this sense of the dual nature of bodies, he continues, “Our body is our 
always being already thrown beyond ourselves, and yet it is equally our root in reality” 
(31). As an inherent structural feature of embodied human experience, ambiguity figures 
prominently in Russon’s work. Not only are bodies “inherently double,” perception too is 
framed in terms of a fundamental ambiguity with respect to our position as observers: 
“Our perceptual life is our unavoidable thrownness into the word of things. We find 
ourselves simultaneously engaged and detached from things” (33). A few pages later 
Russon settles on the terms ‘immersed’ and ‘detached’ to characterize our way of relating 
to the things we encounter in the world. Sometimes this engagement is the familiar 
relation of habituation, and as such, we recognize our immersion in things; other times it 
is our ignoring of things, our detachment from them, that affords openness (37). Of most 
significance to this study, though, is the application of Russon’s immersed/detached 
analysis to describe the ambiguous character of erotic attraction. Like the dual 
interpretation implied in Aristotle’s friend as another self, Russon’s model 
simultaneously accentuates both aspects (sameness/immersion and 
difference/detachment) of interpersonal experience.   
Considered from the perspective of immersion, the friend is seen as exemplifying 
the familiar. When comparisons are drawn, what is noticed is the sense in which the two 
individuals are similar. For example, my friend may seem to be another like myself 
because we have similar personal histories. We may both be children of divorced parents; 
we might each have grown up in large cities where we experienced the feeling of 




religious beliefs were highly influential. Conversely, although we might discover that we 
have vastly different family histories, we may come to realize that the ways we have 
processed these histories and incorporated lessons from them into our lives, are in fact 
similar. For instance, I might come from a large, tightly knit family unit where every 
member’s actions were closely monitored by the group. My friend, on the other hand, 
may have been an only child who experienced a great deal of freedom, but who often felt 
alone because her actions were generally unsupervised. As a result of our separate 
reflections upon these dissimilar situations, each of us in our adult lives may have come 
to prefer small, intimate gatherings. My response can be seen as a rejection of feeling 
continually pressured by the scrutiny of an oversized community, while my friend’s is an 
expression of disdain for the isolation and disconnectedness she experienced throughout 
her youth.   
The above examples illustrate circumstances where, ultimately, individuals come 
to view one another as familiar other-selves largely out of recognition of commonality. 
Similar strands in familial history, shared experiences, reactions that indicate like-minded 
approaches in value judgment—all this information contributes to the sense of a 
relationship as immersed within the familiar. And yet, as seen earlier, such concrete 
details need not emerge through actual accumulation of simultaneous shared experiences 
(i.e. going camping together in order to ‘build memories’), neither does a sense of 
immersion require focused discussion and overt revelation of these areas of commonality. 
Because erotic attraction is initiated at the bodily level14, often a great deal of evidence 
 
14 Generally speaking. Certainly one may experience erotic attraction toward someone they have never 




attesting either to the compatibility or incompatibility of two people’s experiences is 
manifest even without concentrated mental effort.  
While recognition of the familiar self within the other can occur instantaneously, 
as it did with the example of Geryon and Herakles, it may also take the form of a more 
gradual unfolding, as in situations where verbal contact with a person opens up further 
avenues of exploration.  Language itself is an extremely rich outlet for erotic expression. 
In Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis and the Elements of Everyday Life, Russon 
names the “arena of communication” as the primary location through which we engage 
most meaningfully with other humans in order to “negotiate our self-identity in light of 
the experience of others” (112). As examples of the most intimate and formative kinds of 
communication, he cites language and sex. “Language,” he goes on to say, “can be seen 
as the development of our sexuality [and] is the most profound sphere of self-
presentation, of self-expression” (113). Certainly the linguistic realm never ceases to be 
revelatory, for each linguistic expression—whether written or vocalized—contains a 
history of one’s experiences both with the language itself and with situations of the type 
at hand. Thus, having the right words to say or being at a loss for words, and indeed 
opting to speak or choosing to remain silent in a given situation, are linguistic gestures 
that are partially suggestive of a person’s identity. Details such as speaking with either 
subtle or exaggerated vocal inflections, word choices, and even the pace of a speaker’s 
discourse may be indicative (pauses of reluctance, steadiness of ordered precision and 
care, breathlessness of blithe excitement) and therefore informative as a means of 
 





recognizing common strains of experience or opinion. Something as basic as the sound of 
a voice can even offer insights into the entire narrative arch of a person’s life, beginning 
with the most basic of life stories (a person’s level of education and the geographic 
region of their origin, for example) that may prove to be potential sites of engagement 
with that person.15  
We have thus far considered a model for intimacy that characterizes attraction as 
a kind of mutual recognition involving coming to experience, through bodily means, 
another person as taken to be like oneself. But this only a partial account of the erotic 
attraction that is foundational to human intimacy. The other mode of recognition is the 
form of interaction Russon characterizes as detached. When we encounter a person as 
detached from our lived experience, they present themselves to us as unfamiliar. Some 
forms of the unfamiliar are foreign to our experience because we have come to routinely 
reject them. In this case we may either reject them out of habit, or based on principle. 
What is rejected on principle are those things about which we have undertaken rational 
deliberation, and generally speaking, such positions are altered slowly and only then 
through a modified, yet equally rational process of reflection. Our current study, with its 
focus on the primarily sub-conscious, embodied aspects of interpersonal relations, will 
elide such concerns and will concentrate instead on the pre- or non-rational instigators of 
our repulsion.   
Much of what we reject is likely accomplished by mere force of habit; other 
things, we may find, are only implicitly rejected by us—simply through default—as we 
 




do not yet contain within ourselves the means for their discovery. In each of these last 
two cases, the unfamiliarity of the person who is conversant in these areas, may appear to 
us as alien, perhaps even profoundly detached from our experience, and yet still not 
completely unavailable. If the experience of the other captures my interest and “calls” to 
me as Russon has described, if it “pulls” me toward discovery and “elicits my self-
transcendence, elicits my learning”—then, to experience the other in this way, as 
otherwise-than-ourselves and simultaneously (at least potentially) available to our 
experience, is to recognize erotic attraction figured in its detached form (Bearing Witness 
74-5). Here the other is truly other, and as such, offers not a vision of ourselves as 
comfortably situated in familiarity, but rather as challenged to experience freedom, 
opportunity, and openness. Russon develops this sense of detached experience in Bearing 
Witness to Epiphany, where he contrasts the ways in which we “comfortably take root in 
our rooms, our families, our streets, our garments, our friends” against the power of 
epiphany to “break us out of our comfortable attitude” (37-8). In a later discussion, 
Russon highlights the potentially transformative power of erotic attraction, commenting 
that “the erotic other calls me out of my static routines, calling me to be a unique, 
singular agent” (75). 
While the benefits afforded by interaction with others seem clear (the differences 
of others open up a space for development, not available within the context of the 
familiar), we have not yet touched on the issue of describing why a detached other might 
appear to one as a possibility rather than simply an incomprehensible and consequently 
inaccessible other. Again, if all others represent potential ways for our being otherwise, 




explicit a point that has been operative throughout the previous discussion, and yet has 
remained unstated. What until now we have been referring to as individual experiences of 
recognition—either of groundedness in the familiar or openness to difference—is, in 
cases of attraction, actually a mutually experienced phenomenon. As Russon points out in 
both Human Experience and Bearing Witness to Epiphany, all of the interpersonal 
relations and interactions we have been talking about (erotic attraction, touch, friendship) 
exist only inasmuch as these feelings, urgings, and reaching-out are gestures that are 
accepted and also taken up by each person involved.16 Under this assumption, when we 
speak of a person recognizing herself as situated in a relationship of immersed familiarity 
with respect to another, we must also assume that if in fact there is legitimate grounding 
for this recognition, then it is available to be recognized by the other as well. Such a 
process of mutual conditioning is certainly embedded in the structure of erotic attraction. 
For in order to come to recognize the presence of another in oneself (as Russon describes 
erotic experience), that other must necessarily be simultaneously recognizing and 
accepting you as another as well.   
Similarly, in order for the differences noticed by erotic attraction to appear as 
potentialities and not merely obstacles, each person must represent for their respective 
others some combination of being-otherwise that is desirable to each. The fact that for 
any two people, differences will likely overwhelm similarities, also suggests that the 
foreign elements in each potential friend must align in such a way as to match up 
 
16 This may be a potential problem for Russon’s argument, at least as it stands, as it seems we can think of 
cases where one might be erotically attracted to someone who does not respond with reciprocity. 
Unrequited love comes to mind, and also situations where someone may ‘admire from afar’ having escaped 




opportunities sought with willingness to share in a relationship. Ultimately what this 
seems to suggest is that the few intimate friendships we enjoy as humans can be better 
understood by considering the mutually reinforcing interaction among the various 
oppositions we’ve discussed: groundedness and openness, similarity and difference, self 
and other.  
 
3.4 The Recognition of Values 
Russon is not alone in acknowledging the significance of non-cognitive cues 
communicated through our bodies; nor is he the first to recognize the contribution that 
such information lends to human interactions. In developing her account of the 
importance of exemplars to an individual’s moral development, Linda Zagzebski 
describes how observation of an exceptional person can capture one’s attention and how 
this may result in the observer feeling motivated to imitate the exemplar’s behavior. 
“There are people whose moral beauty attracts us,” she says, “We are usually drawn to 
them initially because we admire something easily observable about them—typically, 
their acts, although it could also be something about their physical bearing or speech” 
(60). To illustrate her point, Zagzebski highlights several historical figures as role models 
and describes the qualities she thinks makes them paradigms of morality. Citing previous 
work from Amy Olberding, Zagzebski notes that contemporaries of Confucius frequently 
commented on the exceptional quality of the outward, physical aspects of his daily 
interchanges with others. His unwavering conscientiousness, his polite, courteous 




comportment attracted followers who found themselves drawn to him, at least initially, 
based on observation alone (86).  
Without calling such attraction erotic, Zagzebski considers the role the body plays 
in this process, noting that “a person’s physical bearing, movement, and manner of 
speaking are expressions of his moral character” (86). Like Russon, Zagzebski thinks that 
in our everyday interactions with others, we are acutely aware of a wide array of non-
cognitive bodily cues; but because she is interested in describing how exemplars can 
impact the moral development of others, Zagzebski focuses on a particular kind of 
noticing that Ian Kidd has called moral attraction. In “Admiration, Attraction, and the 
Aesthetics of Exemplarity,” Kidd discusses this notion of moral attraction, which he 
describes in the following terms: “The inner beauty of exemplars is primarily experienced 
as moral attraction: the aesthetically charged admiration for their virtues or excellences as 
expressed in forms of bodily comportment experienced as beautiful” (sec. 3, par. 13).  
Notable here is the sense in which physical cues such as gestures and speech acts serve as 
outward manifestations which convey essential information about the internal state of an 
individual. Although this information-gathering initially plays out at an unconscious 
level, Zagzebski believes we eventually “seek to identify the psychological source of 
those acts” (86). She goes on to refer to these sources as deep “structures” and suggests 
that they represent a kind of internalized distillation of character embedded within (61, 
65, 86).  
Russon, Zagzebski, and Kidd have each identified contexts where aspects of a 
person’s physical presence convey essential information about themselves to another. 




attention toward what might be called moral perception, all are interested in the way our 
physical embodiment as humans seems to engage with, speak to, and reveal things about 
us to other persons’ bodies, independent of—or at least prior to—our awareness of 
cognitive processes. What is lacking from each of these accounts, however, is identifying 
this experience as a kind of recognition, and then connecting this with the phenomenon 
of attraction by describing exactly what it is that we recognize when we are drawn to 
another. As mentioned earlier, I want to suggest that in our attraction to another person, 
the features we recognize in their physical movements, gestures, bodily comportment, 
and speech are expressions of the values held by that person. Some of these values are 
tied to personality traits we may already possess in common with our potential friend, 
while some values we learn from others; they are things we did not previously appreciate 
that we come to understand and subsequently value though our attraction to another. In 
describing attraction as the recognition of values, I would include three main types: 
moral, intellectual, and aesthetic. I will now discuss each in turn.  
3.4.1 Moral Values 
In his article titled “Friendship,” Laurence Thomas gives an account of an 
intimate relationship he calls “companion friendship.” Although he does not go as far as 
Russon in suggesting an overt sexual component to these companionate friendships, 
Thomas does point out that in some significant ways, they tend to resemble the erotic 
love shared by romantic lovers: “Now, people are often said to fall in love. I hold that a 
similar phenomenon can occur with friendship” (218). In particular, he argues that rather 
than being the product of conscious decision-making, “there is a sense in which 




“initial feelings of love are sometimes experienced as an onslaught” (218, italics mine). 
Elsewhere, he notes that in the same way strong emotions are often associated with 
romantic love, within the context of certain kinds of friendship, one may feel “besieged 
by feelings of love for so-and-so, as opposed to choosing to have those feelings” (218). 
The fact that we may be surprised by our feelings (or perhaps the intensity of those 
feelings) suggests that on a cognitive level, we are frequently unaware of much of what is 
happening at the level of the body. Similar to the deep psychological structures Zagzebski 
describes as unseen influences of outward behavior, we generally have no clearly formed 
notion of what draws us to a particular person until after we have already begun to 
develop a relationship. Only then does the rational mind seek reasons for our feelings 
‘after the fact,’ so to speak.  
My primary interest in Thomas’ account, though, has to do with a claim he 
makes— rather in passing—that in the case of companion friends, the relationship “will 
be harmonious only if the parties involved are sufficiently attuned to the way in which 
each other views and interacts with the world.” Later, he specifies that intimate friendship 
“requires a shared conception of the good” (220). Here, I think Thomas touches upon a 
broader point I would like to make with respect to the unconscious attraction we 
experience with certain others. Thomas does not explain what he means by ‘sufficiently 
attuned,’ nor does he provide details concerning how friends might come to know one 
another’s views—whether this happens through conversation over time, or as we might 
infer from his wording, that friends come to understand one another through observing 
physical actions and mannerisms as each ‘interacts with the world.’ This is where I think 




element of surprise: some friends are unexpected because unbeknownst to our conscious 
minds, our bodies are conveying and receiving information about values and views, up to 
and including our notion of ‘the good.’  
At a reception, you are seated among strangers at a table where an obviously 
overwhelmed server solicits drink orders. Nearly everyone asks for white wine, except a 
woman who requests red. When the server returns with a bottle, you notice he 
inadvertently fills each glass with white wine, including the one belonging to the woman. 
For a moment it appears she might speak, but instead she smiles and allows the error to 
pass without comment. Although this small gesture (overlooking an inconsequential 
mistake) unfolds in an environment full of external stimuli, it captures your attention as a 
simple act of kindness. The woman’s reaction—that flash of seeing-dismissing-smiling—
reveals something about her priorities (this is not important), her flexibility (I can enjoy 
white wine), and her attunement to the fine points of a situation (observing the server’s 
stress level). In turn, the extent to which you notice this interaction in the first place—
coupled with the fact that it also strikes you as meaningful and important—reveals 
something about you. Namely, your noticing stance suggests that her gesture arrests you 
(your physical perception) on a subconscious level. Insomuch as your body is engaged 
with the situation—participating as an observer—we might say it is attuned to recognize 
the woman’s reaction and to ‘take it up’ in some way. If her actions express qualities you 
appreciate and value—in this case the moral virtue of kindness—then they resonate 
within you in a positive way as attraction. If the situation were different and she 




such behavior would register as a violation of your moral values and would be 
experienced instead as repulsion. 
3.4.2 Intellectual Values 
Depending on your own intellectual habits and interests, various kinds of actions, 
gestures and body language will stand out to you. On a walk in a park someone pauses 
contemplatively to jot down an idea in a notebook and you wonder if they are a writer. A 
person you attend class with has flecks of paint on her hands each time you meet and so 
you assume she is an artist. Without thinking about it, you find yourself standing in the 
back row of an outdoor play. Someone else in your periphery—also in the outskirts—is 
half paying attention, half watching other people watch the play. In each of these 
situations, the details you tune into—that may ultimately lead to making eye contact, or 
prompt a nod, or draw you into speaking to or approaching them—may not at first be 
consciously available to you. That is: you may not know what, exactly, suggests to you 
that this particular person might be open to engagement. You may not know, for instance, 
that you had seen the paint for several consecutive weeks before you actually ‘noticed’ it, 
that your conception of this individual already involved the unexamined assumption of a 
shared interest in art, that all the information streaming in at the level of bodily 
perception contributed to your feeling drawn to this person.   
We may of course get it wrong in our initial pre-cognitive estimation of someone. 
That potential artist-friend from class might be a house painter with no experience or 
interest in creative endeavors. It may likewise turn out that a person you encounter is 




with your assumptions. The fellow people-watcher might not be an observant introvert 
looking for his next short story, but someone separated from companions who is scanning 
the crowd trying to locate members of his party. Nonetheless, neither of these cases 
nullifies the fact that physical cues provide essential first impressions through which 
subsequent information is filtered and interpreted. My first ‘introduction’ to someone 
might be a phrase picked out of the din of a crowded room where I overhear them talking 
about a film I found memorable. Similarly, my underlying enthusiasm for a literary genre 
or an obsession with a particular book is available for others to take up with interest if 
while speaking I quote or refer to characters or some plot detail that is recognized and 
mutually appreciated. Alternately, you may catch my attention as the person who winced 
slightly when someone else mentions how much fun they had at karaoke the other night; 
you may also glimpse the eyebrow grimace I attempted to hide at the same time. In each 
of the above scenarios, information about myself and others—situations I/we find 
undesirable and information about what I/they value from an intellectual standpoint—is 
communicated and perceived through bodily channels prior to being taken up for 
consideration by conscious reasoning.  
Although film interests, reading preferences, and entertainment choices are to a 
certain extent matters of taste, one’s taste is frequently informed by more deeply held 
intellectual and aesthetic values. Given this, some observations will be more informative 
than others. If I see you reading JAMA, for example, my immediate assumption will be 
that you have an interest in medicine (either professional or intellectual). Underlying this 
choice of reading material, however, is evidence of an intellectual value: a considered 




Similarly, an overheard conversation involving a topic from a recent radio program might 
convey information about both taste (he listens to NPR) and intellectual values (political 
beliefs). 
3.4.3 Aesthetic Values 
The things we consider beautiful are revealing. For example, if I find a particular 
style of architecture—say Shaker design—aesthetically appealing, deliberate examination 
into why this is so might uncover reasons behind my preferences. I may discover that I 
respond favorably to particular elements such as balance, symmetry, clean lines, order 
and simplicity. In addition to these aesthetic features, I may also be registering approval 
for other aspects of the Shaker philosophy of design out of which this architectural 
approach grew—the focus on utilitarian function for shared spaces, or the emphasis on 
quality materials and craftsmanship, for example. Given this, it appears that the things we 
find beautiful are ultimately indicative of the kinds of things we value. Although I can 
identify these values through a deliberative process like the one just described, this need 
not be the case.   
Walking through an art museum with a tour group one might notice how small 
clusters of people break away in order to visit areas that reflect their various interests. 
Who goes where, how long they linger in front of which pieces, what works they merely 
glance at and which ones they study, whether they ask questions, read about, or take 
pictures of the pieces—all these actions provide information about both the aesthetic and 
intellectual values of the individuals. Whether these perceptual details ‘register’ and 




discovery (taking a noticing stance with respect to another person), mutual recognition of 
shared values, and compatibility. If, for example, I end up eating lunch with a small 
group who has more or less travelled the same path through the museum, my experiences 
over the course of the day—my accumulated perceptions—play a role in determining 
whom I sit beside, whether or not we talk, and what we talk about. This same 
phenomenon simultaneously plays out among the others as well.  A person who speaks to 
me may have noticed my careful attention to certain pieces of art, my disinterest in 
others, my standing off to the side reading artists’ statements. Such lingerings, pauses and 
puzzled stares (what, exactly, is going on with this piece?) may stand out because such 
perceptions resonate with their own. Likewise, the person I feel comfortable sitting 
beside (for no reason immediately apparent to me) might be the same one I almost 
bumped into as we waited to view a piece, or whose path crossed in front of, or beside 
my line of vision a few times as we navigated back and forth among rooms in the 
collection. Cases like these demonstrate how two people with similar aesthetic 
sensibilities might experience the beginning of a potential friendship as they recognize 
familiar elements in each other and experience this discovery as an invitation to further 
exploration—as attraction.  
We have already mentioned friendships which highlight similarity. Here, the 
orientation is toward engagement with others with whom we share personality traits, 
dispositions, and interests. Attributing this kind of relationship to Aristotle’s notion of the 
‘friend as another oneself,’ Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews call this the “mirror 
view,” noting that in this case the friend acts as a mirror, reflecting back an image of our 




interested in the same subject matter, or who ask and seek answers to similar questions. 
In this context, friends may acknowledge their values and manifest them through ongoing 
acts of sharing (pieces of art, music or film that fall within the range of established 
categories of preference); they may discuss creative endeavors, or simply engage in the 
appreciation of art together, or on behalf of the other.  
Our previous discussion also revealed that there is another, quite different way to 
conceive of friendship where instead of responding to familiar, established norms, friends 
make available to each other novel experiences and offer avenues of growth and 
opportunities for the expansion of values. Cocking calls this the “drawing view” after the 
sense in which one is drawn along by the friend into unfamiliar territory, toward new 
experiences (226).  Suppose a friendship does develop between me and my fellow tourist 
at the art museum. While it may be true that recognition of similar aesthetic interests 
drew us together in the first place, over time I might come to learn that my friend also 
loves contemporary abstract art, and he discovers I have a peculiar fascination with 
Italian Renaissance frescos. Prior to our friendship, both of us had been dismissive of the 
aesthetic style evoked by these respective genres; each seemed unable to understand or 
appreciate what they had to offer. And yet, because my friend sees value in this kind of 
artistic expression, I am suddenly afforded new reasons and motivation to see things 
differently.  It then becomes possible for me to “find myself influenced in a new direction 
which lies outside what I . . . thought properly expressive of my interests” and, as 
Cocking and Matthews observe, “I may thus grow and develop in ways that reflect the 




Now, I would argue in cases like this, that what draws people together in spite of 
the distinct separateness of their positions as alien to one another, is the direction of the 
opportunities they represent: namely, they are both still oriented in the direction of 
underlying shared values. In the example above, perhaps the friend is able to show how 
abstract art fits into an already existing (shared) interpretive framework, such as one 
borrowed from literary criticism, or some other realm familiar to each. Conversely, 
functioning in the capacity of an other, a friend might introduce a completely new value 
for consideration as well. In this instance, the friend epitomizes a radically different 
perspective that opens up new possibilities and makes space available for further 
development to unfold for their companion.  
3.4.4 Do Opposites Attract? 
At this point, one may wonder about cases where it seems like, rather than two 
people recognizing shared values, they are responding instead to differences embodied in 
the other—cases where one might say, ‘opposites attract.’ As an example of this, consider 
the interaction between Elizabeth Bennet and Mr. Darcy in Jane Austen’s Pride and 
Prejudice. For most of the novel these two characters are presented as clashing in 
opposition. Rather than being drawn to one another, each views the other with disdain; 
they are critical of one another (appearance, behavior, personality traits) and engage in 
heated verbal sparring. And yet the fact that they eventually find themselves attracted to 
one another and end up marrying (and are very much in love) seems to suggest that 




While it is certainly true that Elizabeth and Darcy hail from vastly differing social 
and economic circumstances, their happy union occurs despite this opposition, rather than 
in response to it. I would argue that minor differences aside (yes, Mr. Darcy, it can be 
pleasurable to dance with the right person), Elizabeth and Darcy are more alike than they 
are different; moreover, their seeming to be opposites is more a function of their mutual 
misreading of one another (a failure of first impressions17) than it is a reflection of deep-
seated essence. Once these errors are corrected, the other becomes scrutable as they each 
recognize and appreciate core values from which the words and actions in question have 
arisen. For instance, it becomes clear that both pursued actions motivated by a desire to 
protect the interests of loved ones (Darcy his friend Bingley; Elizabeth, her sister Jane). 
They also have similar, and strikingly unconventional notions of marriage, which is 
especially poignant given the time period: namely, they share the view that marriage is 
more than a pragmatic social arrangement aimed at combining social and economic 
assets. Instead, both Elizabeth and Darcy believe an ideal marriage should also involve 
the convergence of compatible hearts and minds united in love.   
Even their personalities are more similar than different: they are both strong-
willed, outwardly confident, sharp-witted, prideful and quick to judge. In fact, it is 
because of these shared features that they each make the same mistakes in misreading the 
others’ actions and motivations. Elizabeth attributes Darcy’s aloofness to arrogance 
alone, rather than disdain for the schemings of the Mrs. Bennets of the world; 
simultaneously, he thinks Elizabeth is just another desperate young woman willing to 
abandon decorum in order to “be noticed” in hopes of securing a wealthy husband. It is 
 




only when each breaks through the errors of their initial (and ongoing) impressions that 
they actually ‘see’ one another, recognize shared values, and experience feeling drawn to 
those values as expressed (so persuasively, so attractively) in that particular individual: 
‘Elizabeth,’ ‘Mr. Darcy.’ 
Because of this, I think that for the deepest, most meaningful kind of attraction to 
occur, two individuals must have a particular valence with respect to one another—some 
already existing points of connection—of sameness. For without such common values 
and character traits, their separateness might threaten to render them merely separate, and 
the relationship may never have gotten off the ground in the first place.  
3.5 Conclusion 
We began this essay considering the implications of some advice Seneca offers 
concerning friendship; namely, that if you want to cultivate trust within friendship, you 
should exercise judgement and serious consideration before entering into a close 
relationship. On the face of it—and given the specific circumstances of the intended 
recipient (Lucilius’ involvement with a ‘friend’ he did not trust)—this stands as fairly 
sound advice. Certainly Seneca is correct in pointing out the strangeness of Lucilius 
calling an untrustworthy man ‘friend.’ Additionally, I doubt anyone would suggest there 
is no place for rational deliberation and choice within friendship. My quarrel with 
Seneca, and with the broader context of Stoic tradition from which comments like the 
following originate—“Think for a long time whether or not you should admit a given 
person to your friendship”—is that such admonishment places unbalanced emphasis on 




assumes an exaggerated sense of control over things which are not the proper subjects of 
rational choosing. One factor motivating this essay was to offer a corrective to such 
excesses, to provide an alternate account of the earliest stages of friendship formation that 
more accurately reflects the essential role of embodied experience.   
Perhaps one reason why body language plays such an important role in friendship 
formation is partly due to the sense in which (to borrow language from Epictetus) ‘our 
bodies are not up to us.’  Because some types of physical responses are not entirely 
within our control, when gestures, facial expressions, and mannerisms suggest 
information to others, they truly are representative of some deep element inside 
responding to and interacting with a deep element within another person.18  If two people 
respond to such perceptions by noticing them in each other, if they respond with mutual 
interest, feeling summoned by the other, I have suggested this is indicative of shared 
values. Whether we are speaking of moral values such as kindness, intellectual values 
like creative expression through writing, or aesthetic values like simplicity, on a basic 
level, when we are attracted to someone, when physical cues available to our perception 
arrest our attention and draw us toward further interaction with a particular person, we 
are responding with recognition and endorsement of those values.   
 
 
18 In “Of Manners and Morals” Nancy Sherman examines the impact decorum has on behavior. Is there a 
connection, she wonders, between going through the motions of an action (i.e. forcing ourselves to act 
courteous when another is rude even though we would rather not) and actually manifesting the behavior 
implied by the action (i.e. becoming courteous)? Among the behavioral cues Sherman discusses, 
“emotional demeanour, bodily comportment, and tone of voice” are listed as the “material elements of 
decorum”(280). Interestingly, Sherman cites examples from another Stoic, Cicero, whose treatise On 
Duties notes that “a careful observer can read into our characters, ‘from a glance of the eyes, from the 
relaxation or contraction of an eyebrow, from sadness, cheerfulness or laughter, from speech or from 
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